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take the form of permanent changes in the growth
rate of the base money stock that produce permanent
changes in the rate of inflation. We follow the bulk
of the inflation-cost literature by basing our cost esti-
mates on comparisons of alternative steady states.
We follow the recent trend in applied macro-
economic theory by calibrating our model to increase
the empirical credibility of its predictions. The prin-
cipal goal of our calibration procedure is to produce
a steady-state equilibrium that matches certain long-
run-average features of U.S. postwar data. We have
given the model a variety of characteristics that
increase both its overall plausibility and its ability
to mimic these data. The characteristics include
households that live for a large but finite number
of periods, exogenous technological progress, exoge-
nous population growth, costly financial intermedi-
ation, and endogenous labor-leisure decisions. The
model also includes a fairly elaborate government
sector, including real expenditures (government pur-
chases), taxes on labor and capital income, seignior-
age revenue, and government debt. The importance
of the role played by the government sector is a
distinctive feature of our analysis.
A characteristic of the observed public finance
system that plays a key role in driving our results is
that capital income taxes are levied on net nominal
income, so that increases in the inflation rate increase
effective capital income tax rates. In this respect,
our analysis is similar to recent work by Feldstein
(1997) and Abel (1997). However, their estimates of
the cost of inflation are based largely on the ten-
dency of higher effective capital income tax rates
to increase the wedge between the before-tax and
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1. INTRODUCTION
I
n this paper we describe and analyze a 
quantitative-theoretic general equilibrium
model in which permanent changes in mone-
tary policy have important welfare consequences
for households. Our main findings are estimates
of the welfare cost of inflation that are an order of
magnitude larger than most estimates found in the
cost-of-inflation literature. In particular, we find
that a permanent, 10-percentage-point increase in
the inflation rate—a standard experiment in this
literature—imposes an annual welfare loss equiva-
lent to 11.2 percent of output. Most estimates of
the cost of inflation place this loss at less than 1
percent of output. Thus, our analysis helps account
for the widely held view that the benefits of reduc-
ing the inflation rate from the double-digit levels
experienced during the 1970s were very large.
The model we employ belongs to a class of
models—the overlapping generations (OLG) or
general equilibrium life-cycle models—that have
rarely been used to study the cost of inflation and
have never been used to obtain practical estimates
of the magnitude of these costs. The distinctive
features of the model allow us to study a source of
welfare losses from inflation that has not been
described previously. Although our analysis is novel
in these respects, in most other ways it is entirely
conventional. We make standard assumptions about
preferences, production, and capital accumulation.
Households and firms have rational expectations,
and equilibria occur at prices and interest rates that
clear markets. Money demand is introduced through
a reserve requirement. Changes in monetary policy
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after-tax real rates of return on capital. We identify
an entirely new channel through which increased
effective capital income tax rates contribute to the
cost of inflation. Our inflation-cost estimates are
attributable mostly to this channel, which we discuss
at length below.
We can use our model to identify the portions
of our total welfare-cost estimates that are attribut-
able to effects analogous to those studied by other
researchers. In particular, the “purely monetary”
component of our cost estimate—the portion that
is due to the fact that an increase in the inflation rate
is a decrease in the real rate of return on money—
accounts for somewhere between 1 and 5 percent
of our total cost estimate, which makes it roughly
as large as most inflation-cost estimates in the litera-
ture. The component of the cost that is due to the
effects emphasized by Feldstein accounts for roughly
15 percent of our total cost estimate. Thus, the new
inflation-cost-generating mechanism we describe
is responsible for about 80 percent of our estimate
of the total welfare cost of inflation.
1.1 Previous Research
Some of the previous research on the cost of
inflation has been conducted using partial equilib-
rium models. One recent contribution to this litera-
ture is Feldstein (1997), which is closely related to
our analysis. Much of the rest of the recent work
on the cost of inflation is based on general equilib-
rium models—almost invariably, the infinite-
horizon representative agent (IHRA) model, which
has become the standard model in applied macro-
economic theory. Research of this type includes
Cooley and Hansen (1989), I ·mrohorog ˘lu and Prescott
(1991), Gomme (1993), Lucas (2000), Haslag (1994),
Jones and Manuelli (1995), Dotsey and Ireland
(1996), and Lacker and Schreft (1996). Another
example is Abel (1997), who presents a general
equilibrium adaptation of Feldstein’s analysis. For
our purposes, Feldstein (1997) and Abel (1997) can
serve as the representatives of cost-of-inflation
research using partial equilibrium models and IHRA
models, respectively.
Feldstein follows most other partial equilibrium
investigations of the cost of inflation by assuming
that the before-tax real interest rate (or real rate of
return on capital) is invariant to policy-induced
changes in the inflation rate. According to Feldstein,
most of the cost of inflation grows out of the fact
that it increases the effective tax rate on capital
income and consequently reduces the after-tax real
rate of return facing savers. Feldstein also emphasizes
a closely related problem, which is that inflation
affects the after-tax rates of return on some assets
(notably, housing capital) more strongly than others,
causing capital to be misallocated.
Feldstein also discusses the effect of inflation
on the rate of return on money and the opportunity
cost of holding money. This effect has been the main
one emphasized by most other contributors to the
cost-of-inflation literature. The “monetary cost” of
inflation grows out of the fact that an increase in
the opportunity cost of holding money causes house-
holds to overeconomize on transactions balances,
while a reduction in the rate of return on money
distorts saving and/or labor-leisure decisions by
increasing the opportunity cost of future consump-
tion. In Feldstein’s analysis the net monetary cost
of inflation is actually negative (i.e., a welfare benefit),
since an increase in the inflation rate produces an
increase in currency seigniorage revenues that
allows a reduction in other distorting taxes—a
reduction whose welfare benefits exceed the costs
just described.1 Although most other analyses of
the monetary cost of inflation produce positive
cost estimates, these estimates are uniformly small
relative to Feldstein’s estimates of the total cost of
inflation estimates or to the total cost estimates we
present in this paper.
Cost-of-inflation analyses using IHRA models
do not assume that the before-tax real interest rate
is constant. However, in the standard IHRA model
the steady-state value of the after-tax real interest
rate is essentially invariant to monetary or fiscal
policy: It is a function of the exogenous output
growth rate plus preference parameters such as
the rate of time preference and the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in consumption.2 For this
reason, in Abel’s general equilibrium adaptation of
Feldstein’s analysis, an increase in the inflation rate
produces an increase in the before-tax real rate of
return on capital that is roughly equal to the decrease
1 Feldstein’s estimates of the monetary cost of inflation are based on
empirical evidence suggesting that money demand is not very sensitive
to changes in the rate of return on money. As a result, the distortions
caused by increasing the inflation tax on money balances are relatively
modest, and the resulting increases in the volume of currency
seigniorage revenue are relatively large.
2 In stochastic models, uncertainty about asset returns also plays a role
in the determination of real interest rates on both safe and risky assets.
In a formal model, changes in the average rate of inflation do not in
themselves affect the amount of uncertainty of this type. There is, how-
ever, a fairly extensive literature on the empirical relationship between
the average level of inflation and the variability of the inflation rate.
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in the after-tax real rate of return predicted by
Feldstein. The increase in the pretax return rate on
capital causes a substantial decline in the capital
stock—a decline that reduces the marginal product
of capital and produces a lower wage rate. It is this
decline in household income, rather than a decrease
in the rate of return facing savers, that is responsible
for most of Abel’s estimate of the welfare cost of
inflation. Despite this rather profound difference
between the inflation-cost-generating mechanisms
postulated by Feldstein and Abel, their estimates of
the total cost of inflation are very close to one
another.
1.2 Our Approach
Although our analysis of the cost of inflation
shares a number of important features with the
analyses conducted by Feldstein and Abel, it differs
from these analyses in one centrally important way:
In the Feldstein and Abel models, the change in the
real rate of return to capital produced by an increase
in the inflation rate must be approximately equal
to the implied increase in the effective tax rate on
the real return to capital. The after-tax real rate falls
(Feldstein) or the before-tax real rate rises (Abel) by
this amount, leaving the other rate unchanged. In
our model, by contrast, an increase in the inflation
rate causes a decrease in both the after-tax real rate
of return to capital and the before-tax real rate of
return to capital, and it also widens the spread
between these two rates. The increase in the spread
is equal to the increase in the effective tax rate on
capital returns, but the total decline in the after-tax
real interest rate is considerably larger. For example,
in our baseline case, a 10-percentage-point increase
in the inflation rate causes the spread between the
before-tax real rate of return on capital and the after-
tax real rate of return to increase by approximately
1.8 percentage points. However, the total decline in
the after-tax real rate of return is 3.6 percentage
points.
The large changes in real interest rates that
produce our relatively high inflation-cost estimates
are driven by a combination of two features of our
model. The first feature involves our assumptions
about the role of the government budget constraint—
more specifically, about the disposition of the sub-
stantial increase in capital income tax revenue that
an increase in the inflation rate produces (all else
held constant) when the government taxes on a
nominal basis. In the Feldstein and Abel analyses,
this revenue is used to finance proportional decreases
in all direct tax rates. In our analysis, on the other
hand, the government uses the increase in capital
income tax revenue to reduce the amount it borrows
from the public. The resulting decrease in aggregate
demand for credit produces a substantial decline
in the before-tax real interest rate. This decline is
possible because of the second distinctive feature
of our analysis: In the general equilibrium model
we use, it is possible for the government to change
the amount it borrows without adjusting future taxes
in a way that produces offsetting shifts in the aggre-
gate supply of credit. We discuss both of these fea-
tures of our model in detail below.
One interesting result we obtain concerns the
implications of attempts to reduce the inflation rate
from its postwar-average level of approximately 4
percent to a level of 0 percent or lower. As we have
indicated, under normal conditions the government
can use debt policy to offset the loss of revenue
caused by declines in the inflation rate. However,
our analysis implies that once the inflation rate
reaches a threshold level, further increases in govern-
ment borrowing no longer succeed in increasing net
government revenue. Additional progress in reduc-
ing the inflation rate then requires active coopera-
tion from the fiscal authorities, who must be willing
to reduce government expenditures and/or increase
tax rates.3
Our results indicate that the threshold level of
the inflation rate is about 2.5 percent. They also indi-
cate that once this threshold is reached, the welfare
benefits from further reductions in the inflation rate
are much smaller because of the corresponding
need to increase direct tax rates. Thus, our analysis
suggests that further reductions in the inflation rate
for the U.S. economy are likely to be both much
more difficult to achieve, and much less beneficial
if achieved, than the reductions that have taken
place since the early 1980s.
In the next section we present a more complete
description of our approach to analyzing the real
effects of changes in monetary policy and the welfare
costs of inflation. This section also includes a graphi-
cal depiction of our mechanism for generating high
inflation costs and a discussion of the empirical
plausibility of our approach. In section 3 we lay out
3 We view changes in government borrowing as constituting a passive
cooperation by the fiscal authorities. In the United States, the Treasury
Department can (and does) respond to most changes in borrowing
requirements without seeking authorization from Congress. Changes
in expenditures or tax rates, however, require Congressional action.
 Bullard and Russell REVIEW
38 MAY/JUNE 2004
the model that we use to obtain our welfare cost
estimates. Section 4 describes the procedure we use
to select values for the parameters of the model,
while section 5 describes the baseline steady state
associated with our parameter choices and discusses
some of its features. In section 6 we calculate the
welfare costs of changes in the inflation rate using
our baseline parameterization and some alternative
parameterizations. Section 7 discusses some qualifi-
cations of our results.
2. A NEW APPROACH TO THE WELFARE
COST OF INFLATION
2.1 Theoretical Principles 
Our objective in this section is to explain in
general terms the principles behind the model, as
well as the mechanisms at work, and to defend the
empirical plausibility of our results before proceed-
ing to the formal model in the next section.
For almost a generation, two-period versions of
the OLG model have been widely used for theoretical
analyses of the real effects of monetary policy. An
important reason for this is that in OLG models,
unlike the IHRA models that have been favored by
empirically oriented macroeconomists, permanent
changes in monetary policy can have large perma-
nent effects on real interest rates and other real
variables. In our multi-period model, as in many of
its two-period predecessors, permanent changes in
monetary policy affect real interest rates by influ-
encing the government’s demand for credit. This is
possible because the finite lives of OLG households
make it possible for government credit demand to
rise or fall without producing offsetting adjustments
in households’ supply of credit. In the case of particu-
lar interest to us, this can happen because the govern-
ment’s debt is “unbacked”: It does not have to be
serviced by a stream of future surpluses. Govern-
ment debt can be unbacked because OLG models,
unlike IHRA models, can have steady-state competi-
tive equilibria in which the real interest rate is lower
than the output growth rate. These equilibria were
first studied by Samuelson (1958) and Diamond
(1965) and are sometimes described as “Samuelson
case” equilibria following Gale (1973). (Equilibria
with higher real interest rates are often called
“classical case” equilibria.4)
Bullard and Russell (1999) use a calibrated multi-
period OLG model—a simpler version of the model
developed in this paper—to argue that it is empiri-
cally plausible to model the postwar U.S. economy
as a Samuelson-case steady state and to view the
postwar U.S. government debt as unbacked. Their
analysis is grounded on the fact that during the post-
war period the average real interest rate on U.S.
government debt has been substantially lower than
the average U.S. output growth rate and the govern-
ment’s average primary surplus has been approxi-
mately zero.5
If the government issues debt at a real interest
rate lower than the output growth rate, then it can
earn “bond seigniorage” revenue in a steady state
by extending the debt at the rate necessary to keep
its share of output constant.6 Across steady states
of this type, a permanent decrease in the debt stock
will shift the aggregate credit demand curve to the
left along an unchanged aggregate credit supply
curve, causing the steady-state real interest rate to
fall. The decline in the real interest rate will have
permanent effects on investment, output, and other
real variables, including the welfare of households.
2.1.1 The Real Effects of Monetary Policy.
What does the situation just described have to do
with monetary policy or the cost of inflation? The
answer to this question begins with a seminal insight
of Sargent and Wallace (1981): The government’s
budget constraint enforces a connection between
fiscal policy and monetary policy. For the purposes
of their analysis, Sargent and Wallace define mone-
tary policy as consisting of the central bank’s choice
of a combination of base money and government
debt policies that is consistent with the fiscal
authority’s policies regarding taxes and government
spending.7 They assume that these fiscal policy
5 This point also has been made by Darby (1984), among others. During
1948-97, the average ex post real (CPI-deflated) yield on three-month
Treasury bills was 1.1 percent. This yield is widely used as an empirical
proxy for the risk-free real interest rate: The short term presumably
ensures that the ex post real rate is quite close to the ex ante rate and
that the premium for interest risk is minimal. Of course, the average
real interest rate that the government actually paid was higher, because
the average term of the bonds it issued exceeded three months. How-
ever, even the average ex post real yields on bonds with terms of ten
years or more fall well short of the average output growth rate.
6 The term “bond seigniorage” seems to have been coined by Miller
and Sargent (1984).
7 An alternative interpretation of the Sargent-Wallace policy assumptions
is that the fiscal authority controls debt policy but conducts it in a way
that passively accommodates the fiscal authority’s active decisions
concerning taxes and spending as well as the monetary authority’s 
4 Stochastic versions of IHRA models can have stationary equilibria in
which the average real interest rate is lower than the average output
growth rate. However, these equilibria do not have most of the other
distinctive characteristics of low-real-rate steady states in nonstochastic
OLG models.
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decisions leave the government with a fixed real
primary deficit. They show that under this assump-
tion a permanent tightening of monetary policy
(a permanent decrease in the base money growth
rate) is not feasible and a temporary tightening
must eventually cause the inflation rate to rise. The
logic behind this result is simple. A monetary tight-
ening reduces the amount of inflation tax revenue
and leads to a gradual accumulation of government
debt. At some point the debt accumulation must
cease and the increased debt service costs must
be financed by increased revenue from base money
seigniorage.
In the Sargent-Wallace (1981) model the real
interest rate was assumed to be fixed at a level above
the output growth rate. However, Miller and Sargent
(1984) and Wallace (1984) conduct similar analyses
in models in which the real interest rate is endoge-
nous, and the former analysis encompasses situa-
tions in which it is lower than the real growth rate.
Miller and Sargent sketch out a model that implies
that, under certain conditions, a permanent tight-
ening of monetary policy can lead to a permanent
decrease in the inflation rate and a permanent
increase in the real interest rate. The explanation
for this result grows out of the fact that when the
real interest rate is relatively low the government
can earn revenue from bond seigniorage. A decrease
in the inflation rate reduces the amount of base
money seigniorage revenue and forces the govern-
ment to issue more debt to increase its revenue
from bond seigniorage. The increase in the debt
stock causes the real interest rate to rise.8 It is this
situation—one where there is an inverse relationship
between inflation rates and real interest rates—that
we study in this paper.
We now turn to the welfare consequences of
permanent changes in inflation in these equilibria.
2.1.2 The Cost of Inflation. Across Samuelson-
case steady states of models in which the house-
holds are intragenerationally homogeneous, such
as Espinosa-Vega and Russell (1998a), policy-
induced decreases in the real interest rate are
welfare-reducing. When the real interest rate is
lower than the output growth rate, the tendency
of a lower real interest rate to increase household
welfare by increasing the real wage (because a lower
real interest rate produces a larger capital stock) is
more than offset by its tendency to increase the
relative price of future consumption.9 Thus, models
of monetary policy that support Samuelson-case
steady states seem to provide a potential contribu-
tion to the literature on the cost of inflation.10
In the research program that led to the current
paper, we began by reconstructing the Espinosa-Vega
and Russell analysis in a multi-period calibrated
model that allows us to talk credibly about magni-
tudes. Our previous research—Bullard and Russell
(1999)—had established that plausible calibrations
of a relatively simple, nonmonetary version of this
model produce realistic-looking low-real-interest-
rate steady states.11 In the present paper we find
that plausible calibrations of a richer version of the
model—a version that includes both money and
government debt—support realistic-looking steady
states across which permanent increases in the
base money growth rate produce higher inflation
rates, lower real interest rates, and lower levels of
welfare for households.
9 Part of the reason for this is that in Samuelson-case equilibria, capital
is overaccumulated: The marginal return to capital is smaller than the
marginal cost of maintaining the capital stock via investment. A reduc-
tion in the real interest rate increases the capital stock and increases
the severity of this “dynamic inefficiency.”
10 The dynamic inefficiency of the steady states in our model helps
explain why our estimates of the size of the Feldstein effect are rela-
tively low. In the Feldstein and Abel models, the fact that increases in
the inflation rate increase the effective tax rate on capital income is
almost unambiguously welfare-reducing. In our model, in contrast,
higher capital income tax rates tend to reduce welfare because they
increase the distortion of the saving and labor supply decisions (as in
Feldstein and Abel), but they tend to increase welfare because a higher
tax rate on capital income tends to reduce the degree of capital over-
accumulation.
11 In the postwar U.S. economy the average real rate of return on capital
seems to be substantially higher than the average output growth rate.
In Bullard and Russell (1999) we show that augmenting the basic model
by adding capital income taxes and/or intermediation costs at plausibly
calibrated levels can produce realistic-looking steady states in which
the real rate of return on capital exceeds the output growth rate but
the real interest rate on government bonds is lower. The model in the
current paper includes both these features and produces a baseline
steady state of this type.
active decisions about the growth rate of the base money supply
(which determines government revenue from currency seigniorage).
This assumption seems consistent with modern U.S. monetary and
fiscal arrangements. Congress and the Administration make active
decisions about taxes and spending and the Federal Reserve makes
active decisions about the base money growth rate. The Treasury then
passively issues the bonds necessary to cover any resulting deficit.
8 The Miller-Sargent (1984) analysis has been refined and extended by
Espinosa-Vega and Russell (1998a,b), who study the real interest rate
effects of permanent changes in monetary policy across Samuelson-
case steady states of a pure exchange model (1998a) and in a model
with production and capital (1998b). In both models, a permanent,
policy-induced increase in the inflation rate can result in a permanent
decrease in the real interest rate on government debt. In the latter
model, the increase in the inflation rate is also associated with a per-
manent increase in the level of output.
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In a basic version of the model presented below—
one where we abstract from capital income taxa-
tion—the mechanisms work as we have described
them but the quantitative real interest rate and
welfare effects of moderate increases in the inflation
rate are relatively small.12 The small size of these
effects is easily understood. We have seen in the
models that, when the inflation rate increases, the
government earns additional revenue from currency
seigniorage and consequently needs less revenue
from bond seigniorage. As a result, the government
needs to borrow less, the real stock of bonds declines,
and the real interest rate falls to allow private debt
to replace some of these bonds in the portfolios of
savers. However, in the U.S. economy the stock of
base money is quite small relative to output, so the
ratio of base money seigniorage to output is also
quite small. As a result, in a plausibly calibrated
model a moderate increase in the inflation rate will
produce a relatively small increase in the amount
of revenue from currency seigniorage and thus a
relatively small decrease in the amount of bond
seigniorage. This small decrease in bond seigniorage
can be produced by a small decrease in the real
stock of government bonds and thus a small decline
in the real interest rate on these bonds.
However, when nominal capital income taxation
is included in the model, as it is in this paper, these
effects are greatly magnified—they are an order of
magnitude larger, in fact. As we have seen, the formal
analyses of this argument conducted by Feldstein
(1997) and Abel (1997) are based primarily on the
fact that increases in effective capital income tax
rates increase the spread between the before-tax
and after-tax real return rates on capital. The revenue
implications of these tax rate increases are a dis-
tinctly secondary consideration in those papers.
In our analysis, in contrast, the increase in capital
income tax revenue that occurs when the inflation
rate rises is the principal driving force behind our
results: Real interest rates have to fall substantially
to restore equilibrium. Under plausible calibrations,
this revenue increase is much larger than the 
inflation-induced increase in revenue from currency
seigniorage. It is large enough to cause a substantial
decline in the real interest rate and a large decrease
in household welfare.
12 Although the changes in the real interest rate that are produced are
small relative to our main results in this paper, the welfare cost these
changes produce are about as large as most of the inflation-cost esti-
mates that appear in the literature.
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2.2 A Graphical Description
A simple graphical description of the mechanism
we describe is presented in Figure 1. The lowest
curve in the figure describes the ratio of total govern-
ment revenue to output as a function of the before-
tax real interest rate on government debt (hereafter,
the real bond rate) in the baseline parameterization
of our model. The inflation rate is held fixed at its
baseline value of 4 percent. The tax rates on labor
and capital income are also held fixed at their base-
line values.
One might expect the government revenue curve
to be uniformly downward-sloping, since lower real
interest rates are associated with higher real wages
and the U.S. government gets most of its revenue
from labor income taxes. Since the U.S. tax system
taxes net rather than gross capital income, however,
decreases in the real interest rate cause capital
income tax revenues to decline sharply. In addition,
at relatively low real bond rates, further declines in
the rate produce substantial declines in the revenue
from bond seigniorage. As a result, there exists a
real bond rate below which further decreases in the
rate cause the revenue-output ratio to fall. In our
baseline calibration, this rate is roughly 2.5 percent.
Equilibrium in the model occurs at a real bond
rate at which the ratio of government revenue to
output is equal to the government’s target for the
expenditures share of output. The expenditures
target is indicated by the horizontal line in the figure.
The equilibrium real bond rate on which we focus
is the one on the left side of the government revenue
curve: Its value is 1 percent. Although there is an
alternative equilibrium rate on the right side of the
curve, its level is counterfactually high and it pro-
duces implausible values for other endogenous
variables.
Now suppose that the monetary authority
increases the base money growth rate, and thus the
inflation rate, by 10 percentage points. If capital
income tax revenues were indexed to inflation, this
would affect total government revenue only by
increasing the revenue from currency seigniorage.
The increase in revenue would be small and the
government revenue curve would shift upward by
a small amount, producing the curve in Figure 1 that
lies just above the baseline curve. The new equilib-
rium value of the real bond rate would be slightly
lower (roughly 0.3 percentage points) than the
original value.
Under the actual U.S. tax system, however, the
increase in the inflation rate produces a relatively
large increase in the amount of capital income tax
revenue. As a result, the total revenue curve shifts
upward by a relatively large amount, producing the
curve in Figure 1 that lies well above the baseline
curve. The left side of the new curve intersects the
expenditures target line at a point well to the left of
the original intersection point, indicating a decrease
of 2.4 percentage points in the before-tax real interest
rate on government debt. The after-tax real bond
rate falls by a larger amount, 3.6 percentage points,
because the increase in the effective tax rate on capi-
tal income increases the size of the wedge between
the two rates. The spread between the before-tax
and after-tax values of the real rate of return on
physical capital widens by 1.8 percentage points.
As we have indicated, however, only a small part of
our estimate of the welfare cost of inflation is attribut-
able to the increase in these rate spreads.
2.3 Empirical Plausibility
Is it plausible to believe that permanent increases
in the inflation rate can produce substantial perma-
nent declines in before-tax real interest rates? During
the past few years, a number of authors have used
recent developments in time series analysis to study
the long-run relationship between the money growth
rate and/or the inflation rate and the levels of real
variables such as the real interest rate, output, and
investment. The papers in question include King
and Watson (1992, 1997), Weber (1994), Bullard and
Keating (1995), Ahmed and Rogers (1996), Serletis
and Koustas (1998), Koustas (1998), and Rapach
(2003). As in the case of most literature that conducts
empirical tests of propositions from macroeconomic
theory, the results reported are mixed and the evi-
dence cannot be regarded as conclusive. Neverthe-
less, the literature provides plenty of evidence that
indicates that money may not be long-run super-
neutral and that the direction and magnitude of the
long-run effects of inflation on real variables may
be consistent with the implications of our model. A
key aspect of these papers is that they distinguish
permanent from temporary movements in nominal
variables. Since the experiment we study (and that
most of the inflation cost literature studies) is a
permanent change in the inflation rate that alters
the steady state of the model, these studies provide
the appropriate empirical counterpart.
King and Watson (1992, 1997) use postwar U.S.
data to study the long-run relationship between
the money growth rate and the level of output, and
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between the inflation rate and nominal interest rate,
under a range of alternative identifying assumptions.
They find that there is a broad range of plausible
identifying assumptions under which (i) the hypothe-
sis that money is superneutral can be rejected and
(ii) the relationship between the rate of money
growth and the level of output is significantly posi-
tive. When they assume that money is contempo-
raneously exogenous—the most common identifying
assumption in this literature—they find that a per-
manent 1-percentage-point increase in the money
growth rate tends to increase the level of output by
3.8 percent. As we shall see in section 5, this is
almost identical to the percentage increase in out-
put that results, in our model, from a permanent
1-percentage-point increase in the money growth
and inflation rates starting from the baseline inflation
rate. Under the analogous identifying assumption
regarding inflation and nominal interest rates, the
authors find that the simple Fisher relationship can
be rejected easily and that a 1-percentage-point
increase in the inflation rate tends to reduce the
real interest rate by more than 80 basis points. As
we have seen, this estimate is roughly twice the size
of the effect our model produces in the vicinity of
the baseline steady state. Alternative identifying
assumptions produce smaller estimates, however.
Weber (1994) uses similar data and methodology
to study the relationships between money growth
and output/interest rates in the Group of Seven coun-
tries. He finds that superneutrality can be rejected,
under a wide range of alternative identifying assump-
tions, for all of these countries except France. Weber
also finds that the data for the United States and the
United Kingdom are strongly inconsistent with the
simple Fisher relationship, with increases in the
inflation rate producing substantial decreases in
the real interest rate. The evidence for the other
countries is less conclusive.13
Bullard and Keating (1995) use bivariate models
to study the long-run relationship between the rate
of inflation and the level of output using postwar
data for 58 countries. They find evidence of statisti-
cally significant departures from superneutrality
for a number of developed countries with relatively
low average inflation rates, though not for the United
States. In each of these countries an increase in the
inflation rate is associated with an increase in the
level of output.14 Rapach (2003) uses trivariate
models to study the long-run relationship between
the inflation rate, the real interest rate, and the level
of output in 14 OECD countries. He finds that for
each of these countries, increases in the inflation
rate produce statistically significant decreases in the
real interest rate. For seven countries, higher infla-
tion rates produce statistically significant increases
in the level of output. For the other seven countries
(including the United States) the output responses
vary in sign but are not statistically significant.
Ahmed and Rogers (1996) use vector autoregres-
sive methods to study the long-run relationship
between the inflation rate and the levels of output,
consumption, and investment using U.S. data for the
past 100 years. They find that permanent increases
in the inflation rate are associated with large perma-
nent increases (decreases) in the ratio of investment
(consumption) to output. They view these results
as inconsistent with superneutrality or the simple
Fisher relationship. Their point estimate is that a
permanent, 1-percentage-point increase in the infla-
tion rate causes the consumption share of output
to fall by 2.5 percentage points and the investment
share of output to rise by 1.0 percentage points.15
The effects generated by our model are qualitatively
similar, although the magnitudes are somewhat
different. In our model, a permanent increase in
the inflation rate from 4 percent to 5 percent causes
the consumption share of output to fall by 1.6 per-
cent and the investment share to rise by 1.3 percent.
3. A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM LIFE-
CYCLE MODEL
3.1 Overview
Our model can be succinctly described as the
result of a hypothetical meeting between Sargent
and Wallace and Auerbach and Kotlikoff. Auerbach
14 For Germany, Austria, and the United Kingdom, the estimated effects
are clearly significant. For Japan and Spain, the estimated effects are
large but only marginally significant.
15 When Ahmed and Rogers (1996) confine their analysis to data from
the postwar period, they find that the departures from superneutrality
are qualitatively similar, and remain statistically significant, but are
much smaller in size.
13 There is a large literature that uses more traditional econometric
methods to investigate the relationship between ex ante real return
rates on assets and the expected rate of inflation. Most of these studies
find that these variables are strongly negatively correlated in the short
run and/or the long run. A good example is Huizinga and Mishkin
(1984). See Marshall (1992) and Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001) for
more complete descriptions of this literature.
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and Kotlikoff (1987) were pioneers in the use of
multi-period OLG models to study issues in public
finance, but neither they nor their successors have
used these models to study issues in monetary econ-
omics.16 The principal differences between our
model and the Auerbach-Kotlikoff model are that
our model includes monetary elements and that it
allows for productivity growth and capital depreci-
ation. As we have noted in the previous section,
Sargent and Wallace (1981, 1982, 1985) were pio-
neers in the use of two-period OLG models to study
questions in monetary theory and policy. We have
adopted many aspects of their approach, perhaps
the most important of which is their emphasis on
the role of the government budget constraint in help-
ing determine the real effects of changes in mone-
tary policy. In addition, since the source of money
demand in our model is a reserve requirement, our
analysis might be considered an application of the
legal restrictions theory of money that was devel-
oped by Wallace (1983, 1988) and has been applied
repeatedly by Sargent and Wallace. However, we do
not expect readers to take our reserve requirement
assumptions seriously as a deep theory of the
demand for money: Instead we view them as pro-
viding a proxy for money demand from all sources.
In this sense, our money demand specification is
similar to the cash-in-advance specifications that
are common in the cost-of-inflation literature.17
3.2 Primitives 
3.2.1 Demographics. A generation of identical
households is born at each discrete date t=…,–2,
–1,0,1,2,… and lives for n periods. Successive gen-
erations of households are identified by their birth-
dates and differ from each other only in their popu-
lations, which grow at gross rate ψ ≥ 1 per period.
Each household is endowed with a single, perfectly
divisible unit of time per period and must allocate
this time unit between labor and leisure. A house-
hold in its ith period of life has an effective labor
productivity coefficient ei, i=1,…,n. If this house-
hold supplies l units of labor during this period,
then its effective labor supply is eil.
3.2.2 Goods and Technologies. There is a
single good. Units of the good available at a given
date can be consumed or stored. If stored they are
called “capital goods” and can be used in production
during the following period. Capital goods depreci-
ate at a net rate of δ ∈[0,1] per period whether or
not they are used in production.
At each date, an arbitrary number of competitive
firms have access to a technology that uses capital
and effective labor to produce the consumption
good. The aggregate stock of capital goods available
for use in production at the beginning of date t is
denoted K(t). Since the technology exhibits constant
returns, it suffices to describe the aggregate produc-
tion function 
(1) ,
where L(t) is the aggregate supply of effective labor
and k(t) ; K(t)/L(t) is the ratio of capital to effective
labor. The parameter λ ≥ 1 is the gross rate of growth
of labor productivity, and the parameter α ∈(0,1)
governs the capital share of output.
3.2.3 Preferences. A household’s preferences
are defined over intertemporal bundles that include
the quantities of the single good that it consumes
during each period of its life and the quantity of
leisure enjoyed in each period. The consumption
and leisure choices of a member of generation t
at date t+j are denoted ct(t+j) and ,t(t+j), j=0,
…,n –1, respectively.
The preferences of the households are described
by the standard utility function 
(2)
,
where γ >0, η >0, and β ;1/(1+ρ), with ρ > –1.
We require ct(t+j) ≥ 0 and ,t(t+j) ∈[0,1] for all j=0,
…,n –1 and for all t. These preferences imply that
households’ elasticity of intertemporal substitution
in consumption, σ, is the reciprocal of their coeffi-
cient of relative risk aversion ν, where ν ;1– η(1– γ).
Since this is an OLG model, no restrictions need
be placed on the value of ρ other than ρ > –1.
Although ρ is often described as the “(pure) rate of
time preference,” a more meaningful measure of
the households’ relative valuation of current versus
future consumption is their effective time preference
rate ϕ ;1– (1+ρ)
–1/γ. If a household with an effec-
tive time preference rate of ϕ is faced with a zero
net real interest rate, then it will choose an average
U c tj tj
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16 An exception is Altig and Carlstrom (1991).
17 See Haslag (1995) for a discussion of some fairly general conditions
under which cash-in-advance and reserve requirement economies
are allocationally equivalent.
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lifetime consumption growth rate of approximately
–ϕ.18
The parameter η is the elasticity of intratempo-
ral substitution of consumption and leisure. It is also
the dominant parameter governing the share of
households’ time that they devote to providing labor.
We require households to retire from the labor force
at an age n* ≤ n; that is, ,t(t+j)=1 for j=n*– 1,…,
n – 1.
3.3 Markets
3.3.1 Inputs Markets. The firms rent capital
and hire effective labor at rental and wage rates
equal to these inputs’ respective marginal products.
The rental rate is r(t)=αλ
(1–α)(t–1)k(t)
α –1 and the
wage rate is w(t)=λ
(1–α)(t–1)(1–α)k(t)
α .
3.3.2 Asset Markets. There are four basic types
of assets in the model: physical capital, consump-
tion loans, government (consumption) bonds, and
fiat currency. For purposes of simplicity, all loans
and bonds are assumed to have terms of one period.
We assume that households hold any assets other
than government bonds indirectly: Their direct
holdings consist of deposits issued by perfectly
competitive financial intermediaries. The interme-
diaries use these deposits to make loans to house-
holds, to purchase capital goods from households
(in order to rent them to firms next period), and to
purchase fiat currency. The financial intermediaries
incur a constant real cost per unit of goods lent or
used to acquire capital. This cost, which is denoted
ξ ∈(0,1), is assumed to be incurred during the period
when the loans are repaid or the capital goods are
recovered from storage. Households purchase bonds
directly from the government without incurring
any transactions costs.19
The intermediation cost assumption is intended
to act as a crude proxy for the costs associated with
risky private lending—including, perhaps, a risk
premium. At the calibration stage, the assumption
helps us do a better job of mimicking the observed
structure of interest rates on private and government
liabilities.20 It has little effect on our estimates of
the welfare cost of inflation (see section 6.3.1).
Financial intermediaries are legally required to
hold a minimum fraction φ∈(0,1) of their liabilities
in the form of real balances of fiat currency (reserves).
We confine ourselves to the study of equilibria in
which fiat currency is not return-competitive, so
that households do not hold it directly and inter-
mediaries do not hold excess reserves. As we have
indicated, however, we use reserve demand as a
proxy for base money demand from all sources.
3.3.3 Government Intervention in Markets.
The government in the model is a consolidated
federal, state, and local entity. At date t the govern-
ment must finance a real expenditure of G(t) ≥ 0
by a combination of direct taxation and seigniorage.
The goods that comprise the expenditure are
assumed to leave the economy. We will assume
that the level of the expenditure must be constant
relative to output: that is, the government chooses
G(t) so that G(t)/Y(t)=g for some g ≥ 0. Thus, the
expenditure must grow at the same rate as output,
which is λψ (gross) per period in a steady state.
The government issues two types of liabilities:
fiat currency and one-period consumption bonds.
The nominal quantity of fiat currency outstanding
at the end of date t is denoted H(t). The currency
price of a unit of the consumption good at date t is
denoted P(t). Aggregate real currency balances at
date t are M(t)=H(t)/P(t). The real rate of return on
currency balances is R
h(t)=P(t)/P(t+1) and the gross
inflation rate is Π(t)=1/R
h(t)=P(t+1)/P(t). We assume
that the government issues just enough additional
fiat currency, each period, to allow the total nominal
stock to grow at a constant rate: H(t)=θH(t –1) for
some θ ≥ 1. Nominal revenue from currency seignior-
age at date t is simply H(t) – H(t –1)=(1 – 1/θ)H(t).
Real revenue from this source is S
c(t) ; M(t) – R
h(t –1)
M(t –1)=(1 – 1/θ)M(t).
The aggregate real market value of the consump-
tion bonds issued during period t is denoted B(t).
The gross real interest rate that the government pays
on these bonds is denoted R
b(t). Real government
revenue from bond seigniorage (net extension of
real indebtedness) is S
b(t) ; B(t) – R
b(t –1) B(t –1).21
20 Recent work on financial intermediation in macroeconomic models
includes Boyd and Smith (1998), Bernanke and Gertler (1989),
Greenwood and Williamson (1989), Williamson (1987), and Díaz-
Giménez et al. (1992). Our approach is most closely related to the
latter paper.
21 In official government budget statistics, bond seigniorage is not
regarded as revenue. Thus, the empirical analog of bond seigniorage
revenue is the government budget deficit. 
18 The easiest way to see this is to consider a two-period endowment






1–γ. The first-order conditions imply ct(t+1)=
(βR(t))
1/γct(t), where R(t) is the gross real interest rate between dates t
and t+1. In this case the effective time preference rate ϕ is exactly
equal to the arithmetic inverse of the consumption growth rate the
household chooses when faced with a zero net real interest rate.




19 We assume that households who attempt to make private loans
directly would face prohibitively high transactions costs.
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The government collects the bulk of its revenue
using three direct proportional taxes: a tax on real
labor income levied at rate τ
w∈[0,1), a tax on the
nominal interest income of households levied at
rate τ
i∈[0,1), and a “corporate income tax” on firms’
nominal returns to capital levied at rate τ
c∈[0,1).
Aggregate real labor income tax revenue at date t
is T
l(t); τ
ww(t)L(t). The government taxes the net
nominal interest that households receive on govern-
ment bonds or intermediary deposits. Nominal
revenue from this source is τ
i[R
d(t –1)/R
h(t –1) – 1]
A+(t –1)P(t –1), where A+(t) represents households’
aggregate gross real asset holdings at date t and R
d
is the gross real rate of return to deposits.




d(t –1) – R
h(t –1)]A+(t –1). The government also
taxes the net nominal returns paid by the firms to
the financial intermediaries, after adjustment for
depreciation. Thus, the corporate income tax pro-




K(t)P(t –1), where R
kn is the gross real rate of return
to capital net of depreciation, R
kn(t)=R
k(t) – δ, R
k is
the gross real rate of return to capital, R
k(t)=1+
r(t+1), and r(t+1) is the marginal product of capital.
The real revenue from corporate income taxation is
.
Our tax structure is intended to provide a crude
but parsimonious representation of the current U.S.
tax system. This representation captures two impor-
tant features of the U.S. system for taxing capital
income: double taxation of dividend income and
the fact that household income from interest and
capital gains is taxed on a nominal basis. By levying
the labor tax on real labor income, we are taking a
conservative approach so that we do not overstate
the impact of inflation on welfare. We will match
revenues from taxes on capital to the data on the
sources of government revenue, and then we will
allow all remaining government revenue to come
from labor income taxation.
The government budget constraint can be written 
(3) .
3.4 Market Clearing
3.4.1 The Structure of Real Interest Rates.
Our assumptions about money demand, financial
intermediation, and capital income taxation deter-
mine the interest rate structure of our economy.
In the equilibria that we study, the lowest gross real
g Y tT tT tT tS tS t
likcb () () () () () () = ++++
Tt R t Rt K t
kc k n h () ( ) ( ) () ;τ −− − () 11
return rate in our economy is R
h(t), the gross real
rate of return on currency. The highest gross real
rate of return is the gross pre-depreciation return
rate on capital, which is R
k(t)=1+r(t+1), where
r(t+1) is the marginal product of capital. The gross
real rate of return on capital, net of depreciation,
is R
kn(t) ; R
k(t) – δ. Since firms are taxed on their
nominal net-of-depreciation returns to capital, the
after-tax gross real rate of return they pay to the
financial intermediaries is R





h(t).22 Arbitrage implies that R
cl(t), the gross real
rate of return that the intermediary receives on
consumption loans, must be equal to R
ka(t).
Because financial intermediation is costly, inter-
mediaries are not willing to pay R
ka(t) to depositors.
The real intermediation cost is ξ per unit of loans
or capital intermediated, so the gross real return
rate net of this cost is R
kc(t) ; R
ka(t) – ξ. In addition,
intermediaries must allocate a fraction φ of their
deposits to the acquisition of fiat currency reserves.
They pay household depositors a reserve-ratio-
weighted average of the real return rate on fiat
currency and the real return rate on loans net of
intermediation costs: This rate is R
d(t) ; (1– φ)
R
kc(t)+φR
h(t). Since government bonds are not
intermediated, arbitrage implies that their gross
real interest rate, which we denote R
b(t), must be
equal to R
d(t). Finally, households must pay taxes
on their nominal interest income at a rate of τ
i, so
the gross after-tax real rate of return on deposits is
R




h(t). Since the government
taxes interest income from all sources, R
da(t) must
be equal to R
ba(t), the gross after-tax real interest
rate on government bonds.
To summarize, our steady-state asset return
structure obeys the following chain of inequalities: 
(4) 
.
The associated gross nominal interest rates are
equal to the gross real rates divided by R
h. The mone-
tary authority determines R
h through its conduct of
monetary policy. The equilibrium conditions of the
model can be thought of as determining the equilib-
R RRR R RRRRR
h da ba d b kc cl ka kn k <=< = <<=<<
22 The gross nominal return to capital employed at date t–1 is
R
kn(t–1)/R
h(t–1), so at date t the firms have to make a nominal tax




Firms’ total real net-of-depreciation earnings are R
kn(t–1)K(t–1).
Dividing the former expression by P(t) to put it into real terms and
then subtracting it from the latter expression produces the gross rate
of return expression given in the text. A similar calculation defines
R
da below.
 Bullard and Russell REVIEW
46 MAY/JUNE 2004
rium value of R
k, and the capital income tax, inter-
mediation cost, and money demand parameters
then determine the remainder of the interest rate
structure.23
3.4.2 Household Decisions. Households
maximize (2) subject to a lifetime budget constraint
that we will now define. We will let at(t+j), j=0,
…, n –1, denote the demand for assets, at date t+j,
of a household born at date t. Households can
borrow or lend in any period of life. If they borrow
at date t, then they pay the gross real rate R
ka(t). If
they lend by holding deposits with the financial
intermediary, then they earn the gross real after-tax
return R
da(t). The budget constraints of an agent
born at date t are 
(5)
for j=1,…, n – 2 and 
where w(t) is the before-tax real wage at date t, and 
Aggregate net household asset holdings at date
t are 
,
where the population at date t has been normalized
to unity. We can decompose A(t) into A+(t), the net
aggregate asset demand of the households whose
net asset demand is non-negative (net creditors) at
date t, and A–(t), the net aggregate asset demand of
the agents whose net asset demand is negative (net
debtors) at date t. The first group earns a gross rate
of return R
da(t)=R
ba(t), while the second group must
pay interest at gross rate R
ka(t). We will define A–(t)
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as a positive number, so that A(t)=A+(t) – A–(t).
The liabilities of the financial intermediaries are
then K(t+1)+A–(t). A household’s asset demand
problem can have a corner solution for a particular
life period j, in which case the household sets
at(t+j)=0.
3.4.3 Equilibria. Households hold aggregate
real deposits D(t) with financial intermediaries.
The intermediaries use a fraction of these deposits
to acquire fiat currency reserves: φD(t)=M(t). The
remainder of the deposits are lent to firms and
households: (1– φ)D(t)=A–(t)+K(t+1). The money-
market clearing condition is 
(6) .
The credit-market clearing condition is 
(7)
since some household assets may take the form of
government debt. These last two conditions can be
combined, producing the condition
(8)
The marginal product condition for the capital
rental rate at date tcan be used to express the capital-
labor ratio k(t+1) as a function of the rental rate
r(t+1) and thus of the gross pretax, pre-depreciation
capital return rate R
k(t). The value of k(t), which
depends on R
k(t –1), determines the equilibrium
wage rate w(t) through the marginal product of labor
condition. The values of R
h(t) and R
k(t) determine
the structure of real return rates, and together with
the values of w(t) they provide the data necessary
for the households to solve their decision problems.
The households’ leisure choices imply values for L(t),
the aggregate supply of effective labor, and thus for
K(t)=k(t)L(t).
Equation (3), the government budget constraint,
involves B(t) and M(t). We can substitute equations
(6) and (8) into this constraint. As we have seen, the
quantities of labor and capital income tax revenue
that appear in the government budget constraint
also depend on the wage rate, the household labor
supply decision, and the household asset demand
decisions. After we make these substitutions, the
consolidated government budget constraint becomes 
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23 In practice, we fix R
b and R
h at their postwar U.S. averages and find a
parameterization of the model that has an equilibrium that supports
these values, as we will discuss. This parameterization determines
the rest of the interest rate structure.
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(9)
In equilibrium, the level of output at date t
depends on real returns prevailing at date t–1, which
determine the capital-labor ratio k(t), and L(t), which
determines the capital stock given k(t). Thus, given
the solution to the firms’ and households’ decision
problems, the right-hand side of the resulting
equation can be written entirely as a function of
{R
h(t)}, {R
k(t)}, and the parameters of the model:
(10)
where F and ∆ are sets of parameters defined below.
It is readily seen that if R
h(t) and R
k(t) are date-
invariant then the value of the function Z will grow
at a rate equal to the steady-state output growth rate.
Consequently, the steady-state version of the equilib-
rium budget constraint can be written
.
We will confine ourselves to the study of steady-state
equilibria.
As we indicated in Figure 1, if R
h (and thus the
inflation rate) and the parameters of the model are
held fixed, then the function ζ takes the form of a
downward-opening paraboloid in R
kor (equivalently)
R
b. Provided the ratio G/Y is low enough, there will
consequently be two steady states, one associated
with a relatively low real interest rate and the other
associated with a relatively high one. In this paper
we focus on the steady states that are associated
with relatively low real interest rates, which provide
a better match for the data.24
In steady-state equilibria, the capital-labor ratio
and the real wage grow at a gross rate of λ, while
gR R F
hk = [] ζ ,, , ∆
gY t Z R t R t F
hk () (), (), , , = [] {} {} ∆
gY t w t L t
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the levels of real aggregates such as output, asset
demand, the capital stock, and real balances grow
at a gross rate of λψ. Money prices will rise at a gross
rate of θ/λψ, where θ is the gross growth rate of the
stock of fiat currency. Thus, the steady states we
study are quantity-theoretic in the sense that the
rate of money growth dictates the inflation rate
through the standard quantity theory equation.
It is possible, of course, that for given values of
the inflation rate, the direct tax rates, and the other
parameters of the model, equation (10) will not have
real solutions. To fit our model to the data, we need
to solve the agents’ decision problems and equation
(10) repeatedly for a wide variety of parameter values.
For this reason, our approach to calculating steady
states of calibrated versions of our model is slightly
different from the approach implicitly described
by the discussion presented above. When we search
for plausible values of our model’s “deep parameters”
we hold R
h, R
b, and the other parameters of the
model fixed at values suggested by the data, and
we treat the revenue-output ratio g as endogenous.
We then adjust the values of the deep parameters
in an attempt to match data-derived targets for many
of the model’s endogenous variables—including a
target for g. We now turn to describe this calibration
process in detail.
4. CONFRONTING THE DATA
4.1 Calibration Strategy
Our goal is to find a specification of the model
that is plausible in two senses: in the sense that the
values of the parameters are not out of line with
published estimates and/or values used elsewhere
in the calibration literature, and in the sense that
the steady-state values of endogenous variables
provide a convincing match for the data. We divide
the parameters of our model into two sets. The first
set, which we refer to as the fixed parameter vector F,
consists of parameters whose values are not very
controversial because they map into the data in a
simple, direct way. We choose values for these
parameters, element by element, based on data for
the postwar period.
The second set of parameters, the deep parameter
vector ∆, consists of parameters that do not map
into the data directly. Although many of these param-
eters appear in other calibrated general equilibrium
models, the question of their appropriate values is
unsettled and controversial, largely because empiri-
cal estimates vary widely from study to study. Our
24 For most of the calibrated specifications we study, the alternative
steady state produces unrealistically high values for the rate of return
on government debt and the debt-to-GDP ratio.
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approach to setting these parameters is somewhat
novel: We select them jointly, using an iterative non-
linear optimizing procedure (a genetic algorithm)
to find a vector of values for the deep parameters
that supports a steady state that produces endoge-
nous variables whose values come as close as pos-
sible to a vector of targets based on postwar data.
The target variables we select are natural ones from
the perspective of our model.
4.2 The Fixed Parameter Vector
The fixed parameter vector is 
(11) .
Thus, the fixed parameters are the labor efficiency
profile {ei}
n
i=1, the age of retirement n*, the gross
productivity growth rate λ, the gross labor force
growth rate ψ, the gross real return rate on money
R
h (or, equivalently, the gross inflation rate Π=1/R
h),
the gross before-tax real interest rate on government
bonds R
b, and the tax rate on interest income τ
i.
We set n*, the retirement age, to household age
44 (figurative age 65). We set the gross productivity
growth rate at λ=1.015, the gross rate of labor force
growth at ψ=1.017, the gross real rate of return on
currency at R
h=0.9615 (implying a 4 percent infla-
tion rate), and the before-tax gross rate of return
on government bonds at R
b=1.01. All four of these
values are based on postwar data. The choices of
R
h, λ, and ψ imply a value for θ, the base money
supply growth rate, that satisfies R
h=λψ/θ.
Since our estimate of the postwar-average after-
Fe n R R i i
n hb i = {} [] =1,* ,, , , , λψ τ
tax gross real return rate on federal government
bonds is close to zero, we seek a parameterization
that produces R
ba=1.25 The relationship between
R
band R
bathen requires us to set the interest income
tax rate τ
i at 0.2. Our life-cycle labor productivity
profile is based on estimates constructed by Hansen
(1993).26
4.3 The Deep Parameter Vector
The deep parameter vector is
(12) .
Thus, the deep parameters are the pure rate of time
preference ρ(or the discount factor β=[1+ρ]
–1), the
indifference-curve convexity parameter γ, which
helps determine the intertemporal consumption
substitution elasticity σ=[1– η(1– γ)]
–1, the intra-
temporal labor-leisure substitution elasticity (or
labor share of time) η, the capital share of output α,
the net depreciation rate δ, the unit intermediation
∆=[] ργηαδξφτ τ ,,,,, , , ,
wc
25 We constructed this estimate using marginal tax rate data provided
by Joseph Peek of Boston College. We thank him for his cooperation.
26 The Hansen data are collected from samples taken in 1979 and 1987.
The data separate males from females. We average the data from the
two years, and we also average the data across males and females
using weights of 0.6 and 0.4. The resulting profile is a step function,
because the data are collected for age groupings. We fit a fifth-order





5 for i=21,…,76, with the vector
of coefficients m=[–4.34, 0.613, –0.0274, 0.0063, –0.717 × 10
–5,
0.314 ×10
–7]. This profile peaks at agent age 28 (figurative age 48), when
productivity is about 1.6 times its level at agent age 1 (figurative age
21). Productivity in the final year of life is virtually the same as in the
first year of life.
Targets on Observable Quantities
Endogenous variable Target Range Source
K/Y 3.32 [2.32, 4.32] Cooley and Prescott (1995)
I/K 0.076 [0.066, 0.086] Cooley and Prescott (1995)
B/Y 0.47 [0.255, 0.686] U.S. data, 1959-94
hcg 0.015 [0.01, 0.03] Laitner (1992)
alt 0.154 [0.075, 0.33] Authors’ calculations
I
m/Y 0.06 [0.05, 0.07] Díaz-Giménez et al. (1992)
M/Y 0.0592 [0.041, 0.078] U.S. data, 1959-94
g 0.151 [0.121, 0.18] U.S. data, 1959-94
T
k/G 0.119 [0.036, 0.201] U.S. data, 1959-94
SOURCE: U.S. data were obtained from the 1996 Economic Report of the President.
Table 1
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cost ξ, the reserve ratio φ, the labor income tax rate
τ
w, and the corporate income tax rate τ
c.
4.3.1 Targets. The endogenous variables whose
values we target are listed in Table 1. Most of the
target values are widely cited estimates of postwar
averages, so we will not discuss them in much
detail. In some cases, the closeness of a particular
variable to a target depends largely on the value
of one parameter: When this is the case, we will
identify the relevant parameter. It should be empha-
sized, however, that in each of these cases the
parameter in question also plays a role in the deter-
mination of other endogenous variables.
The estimates of the average capital-output ratio
Κ/Y and the average investment-capital ratio Ι/K are
due to Cooley and Prescott (1995). These estimates
are based on a broad definition of capital that
includes consumer durables and government capital.
We target the equilibrium bonds-to-output ratio Β/Y
at the average postwar ratio of gross federal debt to
output. The money-output ratio Μ/Y is targeted at
the average postwar ratio of the monetary base to
output. Since we are using bank reserve demand as
a proxy for base money demand from all sources,
the value of Μ/Y is largely determined by the reserve
ratio φ.
The target for intermediation costs relative to
output, I
m/Y, is based on estimates of the size of the
U.S. financial intermediation sector that were con-
structed by Díaz-Giménez et al. (1992). These esti-
mates are summarized in Figure 2. They indicate that
the quantity of resources devoted to financial inter-
mediation is quite large—roughly 5 to 7 percent of
GDP in the early 1980s. Our target for intermediation
costs relative to output is in the middle of this range.
The value of the unit intermediation cost ξ plays a
key role in determining whether we hit this target.
Laitner (1992) reports evidence that indicates
that the average lifetime consumption growth rate
of U.S. households is not very different from the
aggregate consumption growth rate. Consequently,
we set the target for hcg, households’ net lifetime
consumption growth rate, at 0.015, which is the
net rate of technological progress (from F) and thus
the steady-state net growth rate of aggregate per
capita consumption. In OLG models the lifetime
consumption growth rate can be very different from
the aggregate consumption growth rate, so this target
imposes a significant constraint on our parameter
choices. Our target for alt, the average share of
households’ time devoted to providing labor, is based
on our own calculations.27 As we have indicated,
the choice of η essentially determines the value of
this variable.
Our target for g, the ratio of government expendi-
tures to output, is the average postwar value of con-
solidated government revenue, net of transfers and
government investment, relative to GDP.
That leaves only the sources of government rev-
enue to be determined. We want the revenue coming
to the government from the corporate profits tax to
look like it does in the data, so that we do not over-
emphasize this feature of the model economy. Accor-
dingly, we target T
k/G, the ratio of corporate profits tax
revenues to total government expenditures, to match
the average value of this ratio in postwar data.28
27 The target value is based on a 24-hour day, a 40-hour work week, ten
vacation days and ten holidays per year, and a 70 percent labor force
participation rate. The 24-hour day assumption seems reasonable
because the utility function implies that if leisure hours are zero then
the marginal utility of leisure is infinite.
28 In our model, government revenue comes from five sources: a tax on
labor income, a tax on household interest income, a tax on corporate
profits, currency seigniorage, and bond seigniorage. The personal inter-
est income tax rate is an element of F. The volume of currency and
bond seigniorage revenue is determined by the interest rates R
h and
R
b, which are also part of F, and by the ratios of money and bonds to
output, both of which we have targeted. By setting a target for T
k/G,
we leave all remaining government revenue to come from the tax on
labor, τ
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Financial Intermediation in the United States
Financial Intermediation± GDP ratio (percent)
Lower Bound Upper Bound
NOTE: The value of financial intermediation services provided
in the U.S. economy is large. The boxes and triangles represent
upper (total product basis) and lower (value added basis) 
bounds, respectively, as calculated by Díaz-Giménez et al. (1992).
The lines are simple midpoints based on linear interpolation
between data points and extrapolation of existing trends (solid
line) and no trend (dotted line) at the end of the sample.
Figure 2
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Our parameter-selection algorithm also allows
us to indicate ranges around the target values that
we regard as plausible. These ranges are also dis-
played in Table 1. Although these ranges have some
effect on the operation of the algorithm, the values
it selects turn out to be very close to our targets.
4.3.2 Parameter Choices. A complete descrip-
tion of our parameter-selection algorithm is pre-
sented in the appendix, along with a detailed
description of the results it generates. The baseline
parameter values we obtain using this algorithm
are displayed in Table 2. The characteristics of the
associated steady state are described in Tables 3, 4,
and 5. We discuss the parameter values first, before
discussing the fit to the data in the next section.
Although our baseline value for ρ may seem
quite low, household preferences regarding lifetime
consumption paths are much more accurately sum-
marized by the value of the effective time preference
rate ϕ, which is a nonlinear function of ρ and γ
(see section 3.2.3). Our baseline values for these
two parameters imply an effective time preference
rate of –0.0067. This value produces very plausible-
looking consumption behavior: In particular, it is
largely responsible for the fact that households’
lifetime consumption growth rate is so close to the
aggregate consumption growth rate. Our value for
ϕ is quite close to the value (–0.0098) implied by
Hurd’s (1989) widely cited econometric estimates
of γ  and ρ, and it is even closer to a recent direct
estimate of ϕ (–0.0078) obtained by Barsky et al.
(1997) using experimental methods.
Similarly, while our baseline value for γ  may
seem high, household preferences regarding substi-
tuting consumption across periods are much more
accurately summarized by σ, the elasticity of inter-
temporal substitution in consumption (EISC), which
is a nonlinear function of γ  and η (again, see section
3.2.3). Our values for these two parameters produce
σ=0.151. This EISC value is well within the range
of published estimates. It falls particularly closely
in line with widely cited econometric estimates due
to Hall (1988) and with recent laboratory estimates
due to Barsky et al. (1997).29
The question of the appropriate value for the
EISC is highly controversial. Many empirical studies
have produced estimates significantly higher than
the value we use: Attanasio and Weber (1995), for
example, report a point estimate of 0.56. On the
other hand, an argument for EISC values much lower
than ours can be based on the fact that under an
expected-utility interpretation of the preferences
we employ, the coefficient of relative risk aversion
is the reciprocal of the EISC.30 Researchers working
with stochastic models typically find that it takes
very high degrees of risk aversion to explain the
observed differential between risky and risk-free
return rates (the equity premium). Kandel and
Stambaugh (1991), for example, report that they
need a relative risk aversion coefficient of 29 to
explain the risk-free rate and the equity premium
using standard preferences, while Campbell and
Cochrane (1999) use a local relative risk aversion
coefficient of 48.4 to accomplish the same task using
habit-formation preferences. Later in this paper,
after we report estimates of the welfare cost of infla-
tion that are implied by the baseline specification
of our model, we will also report alternative cost
estimates implied by specifications with EISC values
equal to the Attanasio-Weber and Kandel-Stambaugh
29 In Hall’s (1988) introductory summary of his results, he asserts that σ
is “unlikely to be much above 0.1” (p. 340); later in the paper he says
it is “probably not above 0.2” (p. 350). Barsky et al. (1997) report a
point estimate of 0.18.
30 Thus, our estimate of σ would be associated with a relative risk aver-
sion coefficient of approximately 6.6. While this value is well within
the (very wide) range of published estimates, and satisfies the Mehra-
Prescott (1985) plausibility criterion by being below 10, most econo-
mists would probably regard it as uncomfortably high. There is no
uncertainty in our model, however, and there are good reasons to
believe that reluctance to substitute consumption intertemporally (a
low value of σ) is not in fact closely associated with aversion to risk.
Indeed, Barsky et al. (1997, p. 568) conclude that for their experimental
subjects “there is no significant relationship, either statistically or
economically, between risk tolerance and intertemporal substitution.”
Baseline Parameter Values
ργ η α δ ξ φ τ
w τ
c
–0.223 37.4 0.154 0.26 0.0439 0.018 0.0169 0.11 0.0742
NOTE: Values of deep parameters in the baseline steady state.
Table 2
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estimates.31 These alternative estimates indicate
that the value of EISC is qualitatively unimportant
to our conclusions, in the sense that our welfare cost
estimates are still an order of magnitude larger than
estimates in the existing literature.
Our baseline value for α, the capital share of
output, is quite close to the value of 0.25 that is used
by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and has become
standard in the literature on calibrated life-cycle
models. Participants in the real business cycle litera-
ture typically use higher values for α: Cooley and
Prescott (1995), for example, use α=0.4. We will
estimate the welfare cost of inflation in an alterna-
tive specification that uses this capital share value.
Again, it turns out that the particular α-value we
use is not qualitatively important for our results.
5. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BASELINE
ECONOMY
5.1 A Quantitative Match for the Data
The characteristics of our baseline steady state
are summarized in Tables 3, 4, and 5. The steady
state does a remarkably good job of matching the
data along the dimensions we have selected. The
only detectable discrepancy between a variable and
its target involves households’ lifetime consumption
growth rate, which is a bit less than 0.4 percentage
points higher than the target value, as shown in
Table 3. Since our target for this variable was not
based on a precise estimate of its value, we do not
view a discrepancy of this magnitude as a problem.
We included hcg on our list of targets to avoid ending
up with a baseline economy in which the lifetime
consumption growth rate was substantially (multiple




Real output growth λψ 1.032 Fixed
Inflation 1/R
h 1.04 Fixed
Technological progress λ 1.015 Fixed
Labor force growth ψ 1.017 Fixed
Preferences
Effective rate of time preference ϕ –0.0067 Open
CRRA ν 6.6 Open
EISC σ 0.151 Open
Individual consumption growth hcg 0.0188 0.015
Lifetime average agent time devoted to labor alt 0.1539 0.154
Asset holdings
Capital-output ratio K/Y 3.33 3.32
Bonds-output ratio B/Y 0.48 0.47
Money-output ratio H/Y 0.0591 0.0592
Technology
Capital share α 0.26 Open
Depreciation rate δ 0.0439 Open
Investment-capital ratio I/K 0.0762 0.076
NOTE: The term “fixed” in a target entry means we set these quantities directly based on U.S. data. The term “open” in a target entry
means we did not fix or target these quantities directly. More characteristics are given in Tables 4 and 5.
Table 3
31 Since the Campbell-Cochrane (1999) preferences are not standard
(that is, not intertemporally separable CES), the local intertemporal
substitution elasticity may not be equal to the reciprocal of the local
coefficient of relative risk aversion.
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gate consumption growth rate—a common occur-
rence in previous work with calibrated versions of
life-cycle models.
5.2 Real Rates of Return
Our model produces rate-of-return differentials,
as shown in Table 5, that can be compared with
average return rates in the data. In our model, the
counterpart to the return on a basket of stocks is R
ka,
since corporate profits taxes are deducted from firms’
earnings before they pay dividends and the capital
gains on firms’ stock presumably reflect market
adjustments for depreciation. The “equity premium”
in our model is then the difference between R
kaand
R
b, the before-tax real interest rate on government
bonds. In our baseline steady state this difference is
188 basis points. Eight of these basis points are due
to the reserve requirement; the remaining 180 are
due to the cost of financial intermediation. Campbell,
Lo, and MacKinlay (1997, Table 8.1) report that the
equity premium in U.S. data, measured as an average
of annual excess returns over a long time horizon,
is 418 basis points with an approximate 95 percent
confidence band of [64,756]. Thus, although our
baseline equity premium accounts for a bit less than
half of their point estimate, it is well within their 95
percent confidence band.
As we indicated in section 2, an important ele-
ment of our approach to identifying the welfare
costs of inflation is the assumption that capital is
overaccumulated—a situation implied by the fact
that in our baseline steady state the real interest




Intermediation-output ratio  I
m/Y 0.0599 0.06 
Government size 
Government-output ratio  G/Y 0.151 0.151 
Revenue from firms  T
k/G  0.119 0.119 
Government revenue sources
Household labor tax  T
w/Y 0.081 Open 
Household interest tax  T
i/Y 0.037 Open 
Corporate profits tax  T
k/Y  0.018 Open 
Bond seigniorage  B
s/Y  0.010 Open 
Currency seigniorage  C
s/Y  0.004 Open 
NOTE: This is a continuation of Table 3.
Table 4
Baseline Steady-State Characteristics 












Target Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Open  Open  Open  Open 
Real  0.9615 1.0003 1.0100 1.0108 1.0288 1.0342 1.0781 
Nominal  1.0000 1.0403 1.0504 1.0513 1.0700 1.0756 1.1213 
NOTE: This is a continuation of Table 3.
Table 5
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growth rate. As we have also indicated, our steady-
state values for both these variables are close to
estimates of their values based on postwar U.S. data.
In an influential paper, Abel et al. (1989) note
that in stochastic models an average risk-free real
interest rate lower than the average output growth
rate is not a sufficient condition for capital over-
accumulation. They derive a sufficient condition for
efficiency of a steady state in any model, stochastic
or otherwise. The condition is that gross capital
income is always larger than gross investment. They
use data from the national income and product
accounts to argue that, in the United States, gross
capital income exceeded gross investment in every
year from 1929 to 1980. They conclude, on this basis,
that capital has not been overaccumulated in the
United States.
If we calculate gross capital income using the
definition that Abel et al. employed in their empirical
analysis, we find that gross capital income exceeds
gross investment in our baseline steady state.32 Thus,
our steady state actually passes the Abel et al. test
for efficiency. Nevertheless, our baseline steady state
has too much capital, and policy-induced increases
in the real interest rate increase household welfare.
The source of this conundrum is the fact that the
theoretical analysis presented by Abel et al.
abstracts from capital income taxes, intermediation
costs, or other factors that might drive a wedge
between income paid by firms and income received
by households. In our model, by contrast, we use
tax and intermediation-cost assumptions that are
based on analysis of postwar data. We suspect that
proper accounting of taxes and intermediation
costs would reverse the Abel et al. conclusion that
gross capital income has always exceeded gross
investment.33,34
While our baseline steady state matches post-
war U.S. data along a number of other dimensions,
a more complete description of its features would
take us too far afield.
6. THE WELFARE COST OF INFLATION
6.1 Definition and Measurement
6.1.1 Assessing Welfare Costs. Many analyses
of the cost of inflation compare a steady state
with a given inflation rate with a Pareto optimal
Friedman-rule steady state. This approach amounts
to assuming that inflation is the only source of
distortions in the economy. Our model also has an
optimal Friedman-rule steady state. In this steady
state, the tax rates on labor and capital income are
zero, the inflation rate and the nominal interest rate
on government bonds are zero, and the combined
real stocks of fiat currency and government debt
are just large enough to support a real interest rate
equal to the output growth rate (so that currency
and bond seigniorage revenue is also zero). If gov-
ernment expenditures are positive then they are
financed by lump-sum taxes.
For a practical assessment of the costs of infla-
tion, a steady state of this type does not seem very
interesting, because it is so unlike the actual U.S.
economy. A procedure for estimating inflation costs
that was based on this steady state would ignore
the fact that the economy is distorted in many ways
that do not involve inflation; it would also ignore the
fact that moderate changes in the inflation rate—
changes of the sort usually contemplated by policy-
makers—would not eliminate distortions caused or
aggravated by inflation. Our alternative approach
is to model the most important sources of deviation
from the Pareto optimum and study the ways in
which inflation interacts with them.
As we have indicated, two sources of distortion
34 In our model, if the real rate of return on capital, net of depreciation
and intermediation costs but not taxes, is lower than the output growth
rate (as in our baseline case) then capital is overaccumulated and our
welfare-cost analysis always goes through. However, the case in which
the real return rate net of depreciation and intermediation costs is
higher than the output growth rate—but the real return rate net of
depreciation, intermediation costs, and taxes is lower than the output
growth rate—is considerably more complicated. In this case capital is
not overaccumulated: Maintaining the capital stock at its steady-state
level does not reduce aggregate consumption on the margin. However,
the tax-induced return rate distortion reduces the welfare of house-
holds by artificially increasing the cost of future consumption, and
policies that tend to increase the real interest rate (such as a decrease
in the inflation rate) may increase household welfare even though
they reduce aggregate consumption.
32 Equivalently, the baseline marginal product of capital, net of deprecia-
tion, exceeds the baseline output growth rate. The ratio of gross invest-
ment to output is [K(t+1) – K(t)+δK(t)]/Y(t), which is (λψ –1+δ)(K/Y)
in a steady state. Our baseline value of this ratio is 0.253—a value
consistent with calculations presented by Cooley and Prescott (1995).
The baseline ratio of gross capital income to output is (R
k–1)K/Y=0.26,
which exceeds our baseline ratio of investment to output. Abel et al.
(1989) report a much lower estimate of the ratio of investment to out-
put. One reason for this is that in performing their calculations they
used data on gross investment in private business capital, as opposed
to the broader concept of capital used by Cooley and Prescott (1995),
which includes government capital and consumer durables. Using
this narrower concept, the gross investment figure in the data declines
to 0.16. For additional discussion of this question and related questions,
see Bullard and Russell (1999).
33 The dynamic efficiency literature does not provide any conclusive test
that applies to cases in which gross capital income fluctuates above
and below gross investment.
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are particularly critical to our analysis. The first is
the fact that the government issues bonds at a real
interest rate lower than the output growth rate—a
policy that amounts to levying a tax on bond holders
at a rate equal to the difference between these two
rates. Although this tax is conceptually similar to
the “inflation tax,” it turns out to have much broader
welfare implications, partly because the real stock
of government bonds is much larger than the real
stock of currency and partly because the real interest
rate on government bonds plays a much more funda-
mental role in determining the structure of real rates
of return on other assets. The second distortion is
the fact that the government taxes nominal capital
income—particularly, the fact that the effective tax
rate on capital income increases with the inflation
rate. This policy means that increases in the money
growth and inflation rates would produce, if all else
were held constant, large increases in the volume
of government revenue. Under our assumptions
about fiscal policy behavior, equilibrium is restored
by large declines in the volume of government bor-
rowing and large decreases in the real interest rate
on government bonds—decreases that have very
adverse effects on household welfare.
6.1.2 Calculating Welfare Costs. Our welfare
cost calculations are based on comparing the steady
states of two economies that share exactly the same
environment, preferences, and technology, including
common values of all parameters except the base
money growth rate θ. One economy has a higher
money growth rate, and thus a higher inflation rate
(a lower value of R
h), than the other. A typical house-
hold in the high-inflation economy will be worse
off, in a welfare sense, than a typical household in
the low-inflation economy. We measure the mag-
nitude of the welfare difference by calculating the
amount of consumption-good compensation neces-
sary, at each date, to make the agents in the high-
inflation economy indifferent between staying in
that economy or moving to the low-inflation econ-
omy. This measure of the welfare cost of inflation
is conceptually similar to measures used by Cooley
and Hansen (1989) and others. However, the agent
heterogeneity in our model makes our calculations
slightly more complicated.
Our procedure compares the welfare levels
produced by particular rates of inflation to the levels
produced by benchmark inflation rates that exceed
the Friedman-rule rate. In one set of calculations,
the benchmark inflation rate is our baseline rate and
the associated steady state is our baseline steady
state. In the other set of calculations, the benchmark
inflation rate is zero: The associated steady state is
the one generated by this inflation rate when all
the other parameters are set at their baseline values.
In each case, we begin by calculating the lifetime
utility of a representative household from an arbi-
trary generation t in the steady state associated with
the benchmark inflation rate. Next, we solve the
model for the new steady state associated with a
different inflation rate, and we record the consump-
tion and leisure choices of a representative house-
hold from the same generation t. We hold these
consumption and leisure quantities fixed and imagine
giving the household annual compensation, in units
of the consumption good, until its augmented life-
time consumption-leisure package gives it the same
utility level as in the benchmark steady state. The
quantity of consumption-good compensation given
to the household during each period of its life is
assumed to grow at a gross rate of λ, the (exogenous)
steady-state growth rate of per capita consumption.
The final steps of our procedure are (i) to calculate
the total amount of consumption good compensation
necessary, at an arbitrary date t, to compensate
each household alive at that date in the manner
just described; (ii) to calculate the total amount of
output produced at the same date in the benchmark
steady state; and (iii) to express the former value as
a percentage of the latter value.
6.2 Results
6.2.1 Welfare Costs Relative to Baseline
Cases. The triangles in Figure 3 display the welfare
costs of a range of alternative inflation rates, relative
to a benchmark inflation rate of 4 percent. These
cost estimates represent the principal results of our
analysis. The triangle at the point with coordinates
(4,0) represents our baseline steady state. Lower
inflation rates yield welfare benefits to households
relative to the benchmark inflation rate, so the
welfare cost estimates associated with these rates
are negative.
Since increases in the inflation rate reduce the
welfare of households, the line formed by the tri-
angles is upward-sloping. The gradient linking the
inflation rate to the welfare cost is surprisingly steep.
Over the range of inflation rates considered, a 1
percent increase in the annual inflation rate increases
the welfare cost of inflation by more than 1 percent
of output per year. As we have noted, these cost esti-
mates are an order of magnitude larger than most
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other estimates from the literature. Table 6 sum-
marizes some of the previous estimates.35
There are no triangles in the figure for inflation
rates lower than 2.5 percent. The reason for this is
that, once the inflation rate falls below this level, the
government faces a revenue shortage: No steady-
state real interest rate produces enough revenue to
meet our target value for G/Y. We adopt two different
strategies for addressing this situation. The simplest
strategy involves modifying our baseline steady state
by holding fixed all the parameters of the model
except the inflation rate and accepting whatever
level of G/Y turns out to be consistent with a bench-
mark inflation rate of zero. We can then calculate
the welfare cost of inflation relative to this zero-
inflation steady state.36 The results of these calcula-
tions are indicated by the boxes in Figure 3. Over
the range of inflation rates considered, the increase
in the welfare cost as the rate of inflation rises is
again better than 1 percent of real output per per-
centage point increase in the inflation rate. These
results illustrate the fact that even when the initial
inflation rate is low, the marginal distortion produced
by increases in the inflation rate can be quite large.
6.2.2 Welfare Gains from Lower Inflation:
An Alternative Approach. A second approach to
confronting the revenue shortage that arises when
the inflation rate is allowed to fall below 2.5 percent
is to raise direct tax rates to recover the lost revenue.













The Welfare Cost of Inflation
Relative  to Baseline Cases of 4 Percent and 
Zero Inflation
Welfare Cost (percent of real output)
26
Relative to a baseline economy with 4 percent inflation
Relative to a baseline economy with  zero  inflation
Rate of Inflation (percent)
NOTE:  The welfare cost of a percentage point on the inflation
rate is a distortion which has a size of at least a percentage
point of real output. The size of the distortion is approximately
linear in the inflation rate for the range considered in the figure.
Figure 3
Recent Estimates of the Welfare Cost of Inflation 
Study  Features  Inflation comparison  Welfare cost 
Cooley/Hansen (1989)  RBC model with cash-in-advance  10% vs. optimal  0.387% 
Gomme (1993)  Endogenous growth with cash-in-advance  8.5% vs. optimal  0.0273% 
I
·
mrohorog ˘lu/Prescott (1991) Idiosyncratic labor income risk 10% vs. 0% 0.9%
Dotsey/Ireland (1996) Endogenous growth with cash-in-advance 10% vs. 0% 1.73%
Lucas (2000) Representative agent with shopping time 10% vs. optimal  1.3%
This paper  Life-cycle economy with financial  10% vs. 0%  12.4% 
intermediation
NOTE: Some recent studies of the welfare cost of inflation. Costs are expressed as the compensating consumption necessary to make
agents indifferent between the two inflation regimes. The cost calculated in this paper is an order of magnitude larger than those from
the earlier literature.
Table 6
35 One interpretation of the results reported by Lacker and Schreft (1996)
would place the welfare cost of 10 percent versus 0 percent inflation
at 4.27 percent of output. Other interpretations, however, are consistent
with the lower cost estimates reported in the papers listed in Table 6.
Lacker and Schreft (1996) emphasize resource-costly credit and the
impact of inflation on real returns.
36 The steady state at zero inflation inherits most of the quantitative
properties of the steady state at 4 percent inflation, so we do not report
these properties here. The principal exception is government revenue
as a fraction of real output, which is about 11 percent in the zero
inflation case versus 15.1 percent in the baseline case. At the cost of
some complications, we could use the Friedman-rule inflation rate—
a deflation rate equal to the output growth rate—as a benchmark rate
without changing our qualitative conclusions. However, a zero rate of
inflation has often been used as a benchmark in the literature, and it
has often been proposed as a practical target for monetary policy.
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This approach sacrifices comparability with the
results reported in Table 6, since the experiments
that produce these results often assume either that
there are no direct taxes or that any direct tax rates
are fixed. However, this alternative approach may
give us better insight into the practical problems
of disinflation from relatively low initial inflation
rates.
Figure 4 illustrates how the need to raise other
distortionary taxes affects the welfare benefits of
disinflation from low inflation rates. For simplicity,
we consider a tax increase scenario in which the lost




c) equally in percentage point terms.37
The welfare benefit from further reductions in
inflation declines dramatically once the initial infla-
tion rate falls below 2.5 percent. The total welfare
benefit achieved by moving from 2.5 percent infla-
tion to zero inflation is less than 0.2 percent of the
baseline level of real output. While this benefit esti-
mate remains large by the standards of the other
papers listed in Table 6, it is quite small compared
with the results reported in this paper for disinfla-
tion from higher initial inflation rates.
The bottom line of this aspect of our analysis is
that when the initial inflation rate is low, the welfare
gains from reducing the inflation rate are largely
offset by the welfare losses caused by more severe
distortions from direct taxes. And while the gains
from moving to inflation rates below 2.5 percent
are not trivial, achieving them requires a degree of
coordination between fiscal policy and monetary
policy that is not necessary when disinflating from
higher initial inflation rates.
6.2.3 Decomposing the Welfare Cost of
Inflation. As we have indicated, much of the litera-
ture on the welfare cost of inflation has concentrated
on what might be called “purely monetary” costs.
In our analysis, in contrast, most of the distortions
that are aggravated by higher inflation are not
directly connected to money demand. From a policy
perspective we think our approach is the more use-
ful one, since it allows policymakers to use the total
distortion caused by inflation, taking other features
of the economy as given, as the yardstick by which
judgments are made. In this section of the paper,
however, we attempt to apportion our welfare cost
estimates by source to allow easier comparisons
with other studies and to provide additional intui-
tion for our results.
To repeat, the three basic sources of inflation
costs in our model are (i) monetary costs associated
with the fact that higher inflation reduces the rate of
return on money, (ii) tax-distortion costs associated
with the fact that higher inflation increases the effec-
tive tax rate on capital income (the “Feldstein effect”)
and reduces the after-tax real rate of return on capital,
and (iii) return-distortion costs associated with the
fact that higher inflation produces a decrease in
government borrowing that reduces the before-tax
real return rate on capital (the “Miller-Sargent effect”).
We will begin by attempting to isolate the purely
monetary welfare cost, using a procedure as closely
analogous to Feldstein’s (1997) as we can arrange
in the context of our model. In particular, we look
for a steady-state equilibrium in which the inflation
rate has increased by 10 percentage points, the
before-tax real interest rate on government bonds
is unchanged from the baseline case, and the ratio
of government revenue to output is unchanged from
the baseline case. We avoid the Feldstein effect by
nominalizing the pretax returns to capital using
the baseline inflation rate of 4 percent instead of
the new inflation rate of 14 percent. The revenue
gain that the government enjoys as a result of the
increase in the inflation rate is offset by equal-
percentage-point reductions in all three of the direct
tax rates. This experiment produces a result similar
to Feldstein’s: There is actually a small welfare gain
from higher inflation—0.2 percent of output—
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NOTE:     Revenue made up through equal percentage-point
increases in direct tax rates.
Figure 4
37 An alternative scenario in which the lost revenue is recovered exclu-
sively by increases in the labor income tax rate produces similar results.
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less distortionary than the direct taxes it replaces.
The next step in our decomposition procedure
is to identify the welfare costs that are due to the
Feldstein effect. Again we increase the inflation rate
by 10 percentage points, holding the pretax real
government bond rate at its baseline level. This time,
however, we nominalize pretax capital income at
the new inflation rate. Again we offset the resulting
increase in government revenue by reducing the
three direct tax rates. The before-tax real return rate
on capital is virtually unchanged, but the real interest
rate facing household savers—the after-tax real
return rate on government bonds or intermediary
deposits—falls by almost exactly 1 percentage point.
The welfare cost of inflation is approximately 1.3
percent of output. Given the small monetary benefit,
the total Feldstein-effect cost of inflation is roughly
1.5 percent of output.
Finally, we move to the new steady state associ-
ated with the much-larger welfare cost estimate we
reported in Figure 3. We begin by restoring the direct
tax rates to their baseline levels: The increase in
inflation-tax and capital-income-tax revenue that
was previously offset by a reduction in these tax rates
is now offset by a decline in pretax real interest rates
that reduces government revenue from bond seignior-
age. The pretax real return rate on capital falls by
1.7 percentage points, the pretax real interest rate
on government debt falls by 2.4 percentage points,
and the after-tax real deposit rate falls by 3.6 per-
centage points.38 As we have indicated, the welfare
cost of inflation is roughly 11.2 percent of output.
On the basis of this decomposition, we can con-
clude that about 85 percent of the inflation cost we
describe (9.7 percentage points of the 11.2 percent
of output) is caused by the decline in the before-tax
real interest rate, while the Feldstein effect accounts
for about 15 percent of the cost and the purely
monetary cost is negligible. However, the small size
and perverse sign of the monetary cost hinges partly
on the way in which that cost is defined. If we give
back the additional currency seigniorage revenue
produced by an increase in the inflation rate by
allowing the pretax real interest rate to fall, rather
than by increasing direct tax rates, then the pretax
real capital and real bond return rates fall by 20 and
30 basis points, respectively, and the after-tax real
deposit rate falls by 25 basis points. The monetary
cost of inflation rises to 0.6 percent of output, which
amounts to approximately 5 percent of the total wel-
fare cost.39 The Miller-Sargent effect now accounts
for about 80 percent of the total cost of inflation.
6.2.4 Moderate Changes in the Inflation Rate.
As we have indicated, reporting the results of
experiments in which the inflation rate is perma-
nently increased by 10 percentage points or more
is a standard practice in the welfare cost of inflation
literature. One reason for this is that, in much of the
literature, the marginal welfare effects of changes
in the inflation rate are so small that it takes larger
changes to generate effects of any practical signifi-
cance. In our model, however, the effects of smaller
changes in the inflation rate on welfare and other
endogenous variables are quite substantial. More-
over, from a practical point of view, reporting the
effects of moderate changes in the inflation rate
seems more interesting than reporting the effects
of changes that are very large relative to modern
U.S. historical experience.
Table 7 reports the effects on a variety of endoge-
nous variables of a permanent, 1 percent increase
in the inflation rate, starting from the baseline infla-
tion rate of 4 percent. The before-tax real rate of
return on capital and the before-tax real interest
rate on government bonds fall by 38 and 43 basis
points, respectively, while the real interest rate on
bank deposits (which is also the after-tax real rate on
bonds) falls by 53 basis points. The level of output
rises by 3.9 percent. Most of the increase in output
is due to a large (9.3 percent) rise in investment:
Aggregate consumption increases by only 0.8 per-
cent. Government spending increases in proportion
to the increase in output; the capital stock increases
in proportion to the increase in investment. The
real wage increases by 1.8 percent and aggregate
labor hours rise by 2.1 percent.40
39 One can think of this alternative monetary cost estimate as an esti-
mate of the component of the welfare cost of inflation that has nothing
to do with the fact that inflation changes the effective tax rate on
capital income. Thus, our results suggest that 95 percent of the total
welfare cost of inflation is associated, directly or indirectly, with this
feature of the tax system.
40 It should be emphasized that these are level effects: In the new steady
state, these variables continue to grow at exogenously determined rates
that are invariant to changes in the inflation rate. Output, consumption,
and investment grow at the exogenous output growth rate, while labor
hours grow at the exogenous labor force growth rate and the real wage
grows at the exogenous productivity growth rate. Also, these are, of
course, steady-state comparisons, and so it would take time for these
impacts to occur.
38 Real interest rate declines of this magnitude are quite moderate by
comparison with historical data from high-inflation periods. During
1973-79, for example, the average inflation rate was 9.1 percent
(CPI-U) and the average real government bond rate was –2.0 percent
(ex post real yield on 3-month T-bills). In our baseline specification, a
steady-state inflation rate of 14 percent is associated with a real govern-
ment bond rate of –1.4 percent, while an inflation rate of 9.1 percent
produces a real government bond rate of –0.5 percent.
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The decline in the real interest rate makes it
more difficult for households to consume during
the later years of their lives. Although households’
lifetime consumption growth rate falls by only 0.1
percent, this change has a big effect on their con-
sumption levels at the beginning and end of their
lives. Households’ average consumption during the
first five years of life rises by 1.5 percent, but their
consumption during their last five years falls by 3.7
percent. The welfare loss from the 1 percent increase
in the inflation rate amounts to 1.3 percent of out-
put. The small increase in aggregate consumption
does not suffice to compensate households for the
increase in their labor hours and the decrease in
the slope of their lifetime consumption path. House-
holds work harder, but most of their increased work
effort goes to support accumulation of additional
capital that produces low marginal returns.
The relationship between the size of the welfare
cost of inflation and the magnitude of the increase
in the inflation rate is a little less than linear: The
welfare cost of a 10-percentage-point increase in
the inflation rate is only 8.7 times larger than the
cost of a 1-percentage-point increase in the inflation
rate. For other variables the departure from linearity
is more pronounced. The percentage point decline
in the real interest rate produced by a 10-percentage-
point increase in the inflation rate is only six times
larger than the decline produced by a 1-percentage-
point increase in inflation. Roughly the same ratio
holds for the percentage increases in the levels of
output, investment, and work effort. For the level
of aggregate consumption, the ratio is only 3.7.
6.3 Alternative Parameterizations
In this subsection, we report the results of
welfare-cost experiments that are conducted using
alternative parameterizations of our baseline econ-
omy. These experiments are intended to explore the
robustness of our results to changes in the values
of parameters whose baseline values are potentially
controversial.
6.3.1 Intermediation Costs. As we indicated
in the introduction, we introduce intermediation
costs primarily because they allow our baseline
steady state to do a better job of matching postwar
data. These costs allow the steady-state values of
endogenous variables from our nonstochastic model
economy to more closely resemble long-run aver-
ages of variables from an actual economy that is
presumably stochastic.41 Since the magnitude of
the unit intermediation cost is not affected by
changes in the inflation rate, there is no reason to
expect changes in the value of the intermediation
cost to have substantial effects on our welfare cost
estimate.
As a simple test to confirm the robustness of
our results to dropping the cost of intermediation,
we calculate the effects of a permanent increase in
41 Ríos-Rull (1994, 1995, 1996) studies a general equilibrium life-cycle
model with aggregate production and return risk but no cost of inter-
mediation. Since the model does not generate a significant equity
premium, it does not solve the problem of reconciling the high real
average rate of return on equity with the relatively low real interest
rate on government debt. See Bullard and Russell (1999) for a more
detailed discussion of the impact of intermediation costs in a non-
stochastic model.
Real Effects of a Permanent 1-Percentage-Point Increase in the Inflation Rate
Variable  % Change  Variable  % Change
Before-tax real MPK –0.38 Real wage +1.8
Before-tax real bond rate –0.43 Labor hours +2.1
After-tax real deposit rate –0.53
Consumption growth –0.08
Output +3.9 First 5 periods +1.5
Consumption +0.8 Last 5 periods –3.7
Investment +9.3 Welfare –1.3
NOTE: The figures for return rates are changes in percentage points. The figures for output, consumption, investment, the real wage,
labor hours, and first- and last-five-periods consumption are percent changes in levels. The figure for consumption growth is the
percentage point change in the lifetime growth rate. The welfare cost figure is the required consumption compensation as a percent
of the initial level of output.
Table 7
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the inflation rate starting from the steady state that
our model produces when the intermediation cost
is set at zero but none of the other baseline values
are changed. (This new steady state is not a very
good match for postwar data along some of the
dimensions we have described.) The cost of a 1-
percentage-point increase in the inflation rate is
1.1 percent of output, while the cost of a 10-
percentage-point increase is 9.8 percent of output.
Although the differences between these estimates
and our original estimates are not entirely incon-
siderable, they would not affect our conclusions in
any important way.
6.3.2 Intertemporal Substitution in Con-
sumption. Our parameter selection procedure
produces relatively low values for the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in consumption and the
pure rate of time preference. Some economists
might argue that households with the preferences
we describe are implausibly resistant to intertem-
poral substitution and/or place an implausibly high
value on future consumption relative to current
consumption. It turns out that by reducing the value
of the indifference curvature parameter γ —which
increases the value of σ associated with a fixed
value of η—and increasing the pure time preference
rate ρ so as to keep the ratio of government expendi-
tures to output constant, we can create a family of
alternative steady states that match postwar data
nearly as well as our baseline steady state. To investi-
gate the robustness of our results to different sub-
stitution elasticities and time preference rates, we
examined the characteristics of a member of this
family of specifications with an IESC of 0.56—a
point estimate due to Attanasio and Weber (1995)
that is substantially larger than our baseline value
for σ. The corresponding value of the pure time
preference rate is –0.048.42 The welfare cost of a
1-percentage-point increase in the inflation rate is
now 1.1 percent of output, while the cost of a 10-
percentage-point increase in inflation becomes 8.3
percent of output. Although these estimates are
somewhat smaller than our original estimates
(particularly in the latter case), the differences
remain too small to affect our conclusions.43
An interesting feature of these alternative experi-
ments is that the changes in the values of other
endogenous variables that result from increases in
the inflation rate are smaller, and in some cases
different in sign, than the changes produced by our
original experiments. For example, when the infla-
tion rate is increased by 1 percentage point, the
before-tax real government bond rate falls by only
15 basis points (compared with 43 basis points) and
the level of output rises by only 0.3 percent (com-
pared with 3.9 percent). In the 10-percentage-point–
increase case, moreover, the real bond rate falls by
only 0.7 percentage points (compared with 2.4
percentage points) and the level of output falls by
3.4 percent (compared with rising by 24.1 percent).
The small size of the changes in the pretax real
bond rate are attributable to the fact that when σ is
high, aggregate saving is very sensitive to changes
in the real interest rate, so that a small reduction in
the rate produces a large decline in the real stock
of bonds and a large decrease in the revenue from
bond seigniorage. The changes in output are small
because small declines in the pretax real rate produce
small increases in the capital stock—increases that
are largely offset, or more than offset, by the decrease
in the capital stock that is caused by the increase in
the effective tax rate on capital income. The changes
in welfare remain large because households with
large values of σ are very sensitive to small changes
in the slope of their lifetime consumption paths.
However, the Feldstein effect becomes a much larger
component of the cost of inflation, accounting for
a bit more than half the total cost: 4.3 percentage
points of 8.3 percent of output.
The results presented in this subsection demon-
strate that it is possible to believe that inflation has
very high welfare costs without believing that per-
manent increases in the inflation rate produce large
permanent increases in the level of output. In addi-
tion, these results make it possible to believe that
the Feldstein effect is nearly as large as Feldstein’s
(1997) estimate, while at the same time believing
that the total cost of inflation is substantially larger.
6.3.3 Capital Share of Output. Our best-fit
value for α, the capital share of output, is somewhat
lower than values used in the literature on real
business cycles. Cooley and Prescott (1995), for
example, recommend a value of 0.4 for this param-
(1991). The welfare costs of 1-percentage-point and 10-percentage-
point increases in the inflation rate are 1.4 percent and 13.8 percent
of output, respectively.
42 Hurd (1989) estimates the difference between the risk-free real inter-
est rate facing households and the pure time preference rate at 4.1
percent. This estimate is widely used in the literature on calibrated
OLG models. Since our estimate of the risk-free rate facing house-
holds is zero, the associated estimate of the pure time preference
would be –0.041.
43 We also conducted welfare-cost experiments from a baseline steady
state with σ=1/29, an estimate based on Kandel and Stambaugh 
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eter. We will investigate the robustness of our results
to changes in the capital share by examining an
alternative steady state in which α is increased to
0.4 but the other parameters retain their baseline
values. (Again, this alternative steady state is not a
good match for postwar data along some dimen-
sions.) The welfare costs of 1-percentage-point and
10-percentage-point increases in the inflation rate
fall to 0.7 percent and 7.0 percent of the initial
steady-state level of output, respectively. Although
these cost estimates are substantially smaller than
the estimate produced by our baseline steady state,
they remain large enough, relative to other values
that have appeared in the literature, to support our
qualitative conclusions.44
7. QUALIFICATIONS
7.1 The Magnitude of Our Cost Estimates
The continuing interest in academic research
on the cost of inflation grows out of the fact that most
of the cost estimates the literature has produced
are quite small—too small to satisfy the intuition of
many economists and far too small to explain the
abhorrence with which inflation is regarded by many
members of the business and policy communities.
Our cost estimates, on the other hand, may be large
enough to produce the opposite problem: If inflation
is really this costly, it seems hard to understand why
monetary policymakers would ever allow the infla-
tion rate to rise above very low levels.
Our model provides one explanation for the
persistence of moderately high inflation rates that
seems natural to us: Higher inflation rates produce
higher levels of output and employment. Policy-
makers typically assume that policies that increase
output and hours worked also increase public wel-
fare. Economic theory does not necessarily concur,
and we think our model provides an empirically
plausible counterexample.
It must be noted, however, that our cost estimates
are founded on some basic assumptions that may
not be very reasonable in practice, and that more
realistic assumptions could reduce the size of the
estimates substantially. Our principal defense for
these assumptions is that analogous ones have
been adopted by most other participants in the
inflation-cost literature, so that adopting them facili-
tates comparisons with the literature. In addition,
these assumptions have not been considered very
controversial.
One of our most important assumptions is that
changes in monetary policy are not accompanied
by changes in the active elements of fiscal policy
(expenditure or tax policy). Most of the previous
literature makes the somewhat weaker assumption
that changes in monetary policy do not result in
changes in government expenditures. In the “mone-
tary cost” literature, the increased seigniorage rev-
enue produced by higher inflation rates is usually
returned to the public via lump-sum taxes; Feldstein
(1997) and Abel (1997) assume that inflation-induced
increases in government revenue are offset by
decreases in direct tax rates. We follow our prede-
cessors by assuming that changes in the inflation rate
do not result in changes in government expenditures
(relative to output), but we also assume that there
are no changes in direct tax rates. We are able to
make this assumption because in our model the
increased government revenue generated by higher
inflation can be offset by reductions in government
borrowing that decrease the amount of revenue
from bond seigniorage.
We think the assumption that the government
does not respond to changes in monetary policy by
changing direct tax rates is quite plausible for esti-
mating the welfare effects of small or moderate
changes in the inflation rate—much more plausible,
in fact, than the alternatives just described. However,
this assumption begins to seem much less plausible
when applied to large changes. One reason for this
is that in our model, large changes in the inflation
rate produce huge changes in the volume of govern-
ment borrowing. When the inflation rate rises by
10 percent, for example, a steady-state government
budget deficit amounting to 1 percent of output
becomes a steady-state budget surplus of 5.5 percent
of output. (The government dissipates the surplus
by lending to the public.45)
If we assume that large increases in government
revenue are partly offset by cuts in direct tax rates,
then the pretax real interest rate becomes less sensi-
tive to increases in the inflation rate and the welfare
45 The government budget deficit is equal to the amount of revenue
from bond seigniorage. In our model, a permanent 1 percent increase
in the inflation rate cuts the steady-state budget deficit from 1 percent
of output to 0.5 percent of output.
44 One partial explanation for the decline in the cost estimates here, and
also in the zero-intermediation-cost case, is that the initial G/Y ratio
is substantially smaller than in the baseline steady state. Since the
inflation-cost-generating mechanism we describe works through the
government budget constraint, lower values of G/Y tend to produce
lower cost estimates. A more thoroughgoing respecification that kept
this ratio constant would produce substantially higher estimates.
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costs of such increases become smaller. Suppose
we assume, for example, that when the monetary
authority increases the inflation rate by 10 percent-
age points the fiscal policy authority responds by
allowing the deficit-output ratio to fall by only half
the amount just described—a decline that still leaves
the government with a very substantial surplus—
and offsets the rest of the revenue increase by equal-
percentage-point reductions in the three direct tax
rates. In this case, the pretax real bond rate falls by
only 1.5 percentage points instead of 2.4 percentage
points, and the welfare cost of the 10-percentage-
point increase in inflation is only 7.0 percent of
output. Smaller deficit reductions produce smaller
cost estimates.46
We have also followed most of the previous litera-
ture by confining our analysis to comparisons of
steady states. Thus, we are estimating the costs of
permanent changes in the inflation rate produced
by permanent and perfectly credible changes in
monetary policy. A more complete analysis of the
welfare implications of changes in inflation would
study costs (or benefits) incurred during the transi-
tion path from one steady state to another, and it
would also incorporate the fact that there is inevitably
uncertainty about exactly what the new inflation
target is and whether the monetary authority will
persist in trying to reach it. While uncertainty about
policy implementation is beyond the scope of this
paper, we have done preliminary research on the
properties of transition paths. Our findings indicate
that in our model, a complete or nearly complete
transition from one steady state to another is likely
to take quite a long time. Thus, our results should
not be interpreted as suggesting that the welfare
gains from lower inflation can be realized quickly,
and it is not entirely inconceivable that a transition
analysis might reveal that a permanent decrease in
the inflation rate imposes large costs on households
whose lives overlap the date of the policy change
or who are born in the years immediately following
the change.
We can cite one interesting piece of evidence
which suggests that transition analysis is unlikely
to have any dramatic effect on our conclusions.
Suppose we imagine that the shift from the old
steady state to the new steady state occurs instantly
at some date T, so that the households who are
alive at date T—the members of generations T, T–1,
T – 2,…,T – 54, who have 55, 54,...,1 years left to
live, respectively—switch immediately from the
consumption-leisure bundles associated with the
old steady state to the bundles associated with the
new one. We can then use our utility function to
conduct across-steady-state comparisons of the
welfare of these 55 cohorts of households during
the remaining years of their lives. In our baseline
economy, the “remaining welfare” of the members
of each cohort is higher in a steady state with a 3
percent inflation rate than in the baseline steady
state with its 4 percent inflation rate. Thus, if the
transition path between the steady states is mono-
tonic, as our preliminary results also suggest, then
the benefits of a disinflation undertaken at a date T
should start accruing immediately to all members
of the society.
7.2 Modeling the Tax System
Our assumptions about the tax system are at
best a crude approximation of the complex and
nonlinear array of taxes imposed by U.S. federal,
state, and local governments. We have adopted the
conservative approach of allowing a large fraction
of government expenditures to be financed by a tax
on real labor income—a tax whose effective rate
does not depend on the rate of inflation. This deci-
sion probably causes us to understate the historical
welfare cost of inflation: Actual income taxes are
levied on nominal income in a progressive manner
and, prior to the 1980s, “bracket creep” allowed
increases in inflation to increase both effective labor
income tax rates and government labor income tax
revenues. We also ignore the historical effect of
“bracket creep” on income from interest and capital
gains. (In the case of capital gains, the tax reforms
of the 1980s reduced this effect but did not eliminate
it entirely.) On the other hand, our assumption that
the corporate profits tax acts analogously to the
interest income tax as a tax on nominal returns to
capital is at least partly counterfactual: Under the
U.S. tax system, the effective corporate profits tax
rate is not directly increased by inflation. However,
we think this assumption is reasonable, as a first
approximation, for two reasons. First, our corporate
profits tax is intended partly as a proxy for a tax on
capital gains, which is absent from our model: The
effective tax rate on capital gains does increase with
higher inflation. Second, the fact that the U.S. tax
system uses historic cost depreciation allows infla-
tion to increase the effective tax rate on corporate
46 A policy of holding the deficit-output ratio fixed produces an
unchanged pretax real bond rate and thus duplicates the Feldstein
effect, yielding a welfare cost of 1.2 percent of output.
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profits indirectly, by reducing the real value of depre-
ciation allowances.47
Our model also abstracts from another important
feature of the U.S. tax system, which is that house-
holds may deduct mortgage interest payments (and
before the 1980s, other interest payments) from
their taxable incomes. But our tax assumptions
account for this effect by taxing households on their
net interest income. In our general equilibrium envi-
ronment, the net asset position of the households
is essentially the capital stock of the economy.
Similarly, our model does not distinguish returns
paid by firms as dividends from returns paid as
interest: Under the U.S. tax system, firms are taxed
on the former but not the latter. As a result, it may
seem that we are overstating the extent of double
taxation of capital. We address this problem by
choosing a relatively low corporate profits tax rate—
a rate that allows us to duplicate the observed ratio
of corporate profits tax revenue to government
expenditures in our baseline equilibrium.
In sum, we think our tax assumptions provide
an approximation of the U.S. tax system that is ade-
quate for our purposes. However, further research
on the nature of the interaction between inflation
and the tax code in general equilibrium models is
certainly warranted.48
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we use a dynamic general equilib-
rium model to estimate the welfare cost of inflation
in the U.S. economy. According to our estimates,
inflation is far more costly than most of the litera-
ture to date has indicated. However, our estimates
of the purely monetary component of the cost of
inflation—the component studied in most previous
work on this topic—are of the same order of magni-
tude as previous estimates. Our much-larger total
cost estimates grow out of the fact that in our model,
inflation has a substantial impact on the real rates
of return on nonmonetary assets. Thus, our results
provide a formal interpretation of a view about the
source of inflation costs that is often expressed in
business and policy circles as well as academic
discussions.
In our model, most of the welfare cost of inflation
is attributable to the fact that higher inflation rates
increase the effective tax rate on capital income.
However, the portion of the cost that is driven by
the tendency of increases in the capital tax rate to
widen the spread between the before-tax and after-
tax real return rates on capital—a distortion whose
impact has been studied by Feldstein (1997) and
Abel (1997)—is relatively small. Instead, the lion’s
share of the welfare cost of higher inflation is attrib-
utable to its tendency to produce a downward shift
in the entire structure of real interest rates, both
before and after taxes. This general decline in real
interest rates is a consequence of our assumption
that fiscal policymakers respond to the increase in
tax revenue that higher inflation produces by reduc-
ing government borrowing rather than by cutting
tax rates.
Our results have at least two important implica-
tions for further study of inflation costs and related
issues. First, they indicate that abstracting from
general equilibrium considerations may lead to
serious underestimates of the welfare cost of infla-
tion—a conclusion we share with Dotsey and Ireland
(1996). Second, they demonstrate that plausible
alternatives to the standard calibrated dynamic
general equilibrium model may produce very differ-
ent estimates of the cost of inflation—and, by exten-
sion, very different answers to other outstanding
questions in macroeconomics.
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Appendix
CHOOSING PARAMETERS BY MEANS
OF NONLINEAR OPTIMIZATION
As we have indicated in the text, we use a genetic
algorithm to learn about the irregular nonlinear map
between the vector ∆ of “deep parameters” and the
endogenous variables whose values we target.49
Given a candidate vector j at algorithm time s, ∆js,
we can calculate the solution to the agents’ decision
problem, and based on that information, we can
find the implied steady-state equilibrium values for
the targets associated with candidate vector j. We
define a fitness criterion for a candidate vector ∆js
based on deviations of these implied values from
targets. We use a genetic algorithm with real-valued
coding, and operators providing tournament repro-
duction, three types of crossover, and non-uniform
mutation, as explained below. Because our non-
uniform mutation procedure slowly reduces the
mutation rate to zero by time T, separate genetic
algorithm searches can yield different best-fit candi-
date vectors ∆* T. We conduct ten such searches and
report the best-fit vectors.
We begin by defining a fitness criterion across
the nine targets of our system. We want to consider
a criterion on the order of sum of squared deviations
from target, but we also want the genetic algorithm
to consider the fact that some targets are tighter than
others in that the plausible deviation from them is
smaller. Accordingly, we think of the target ranges
as defining the space of plausible outcomes, and we
design our fitness criterion to penalize candidate
vectors ∆js more severely if they deliver values out-
side the target range. This will prevent the genetic
algorithm from spending a lot of time searching
areas of the parameter space that are good on many
dimensions but bad on a few dimensions. We assign
penalty points based on deviations from target on
each dimension. The penalty points are assigned
linearly up to the boundary of the target, such that
a candidate vector is penalized one point if a par-
ticular value is at the boundary of the target range.
Outside the target range, an appropriately scaled
quadratic penalty in the difference between the value
and target boundary is added to the linear penalty.
If we denote implied values of a candidate vector
∆js by θijs, target values by θ* i, and upper and lower
target bounds by θ
–
i and θi, respectively, where i=1,
…,9, then the fitness of the candidate vector, F[∆js],
is given by
49 A more complete discussion of the principles of genetic algorithms
would take us too far afield. For an introduction, as well as detailed
description of the real-valued approach we use and the associated
genetic operators, see Michalewicz (1994).
 Bullard and Russell REVIEW
66 MAY/JUNE 2004
This definition means that the better-fit vectors will
have lower fitness values, and a vector that delivers
an exact fit on all targets will have a fitness of zero.
The genetic algorithm is an iterative, directed
search procedure acting on a population of j candi-
date vectors at algorithm time s. At time s, the fitness
of all candidate vectors in the population is calcu-
lated. To obtain the next set of candidate vectors,
∆js+1, we apply genetic operators. The first operator
is tournament reproduction. We select two vectors
at random with replacement from the time s pop-
ulation. The vector with the better fitness value is
copied into the time s+1 population. This operator is
repeated enough times to produce a time s+1
population equal in size to the time s population.
Reproduction provides most of the evolutionary
pressure in the search algorithm, but we need other
operators to allow the system to experiment with
new, untried candidate vectors. Crossover and muta-
tion provide the experimentation and operate on
the time s+1 population before the fitness values
for that population are calculated.
To implement our crossover operators, we con-
sider the time s+1 population two vectors, j and
j+1, at a time, and we implement the crossover
operator with probability p
c. If crossover is to be
performed on the two vectors, we use one of three
methods with equal probability. In single-point
crossover, we choose a random integer icross ∈[1,…,9]
and swap the elements of ∆j,s+1 and ∆j+1,s+1 where
i ≥ icross. In arithmetic crossover, we choose a random
real a ∈[0,1] and create post-crossover vectors
a∆j,s+1+(1– a)∆j+1,s+1 and (1– a)∆j,s+1+a∆j+1,s+1.
In shuffle crossover, we exchange elements of ∆j,s
and ∆j+1,s based on draws from a binomial distri-
bution, such that if the ith draw is unity, the ith
elements are swapped, otherwise the ith elements
are not swapped. Each of these operators has been
shown to have strengths in the evolutionary pro-
graming literature in certain types of difficult search
problems, and we use them all here to improve the
prospects for success.
We implement a non-uniform mutation operator
that makes use of upper and lower bounds, δ
–
i and
δ –i, respectively, on the elements of a candidate
vector ∆j+1,s. This operator is implemented with
probability p
m on element δij,s+1. If mutation is to
be performed on the element, we choose a pair of
random reals r1,r2 ~ U[0,1]. The new, perturbed
value of the element is then set according to
(A.3) 
where b is a parameter. With this mutation operator,
the probability of choosing a new element far from
the existing element diminishes as algorithm time
s → T, where T is the maximum algorithm time.
This operator is especially useful in allowing the
genetic algorithm to more intensively sample in
the neighborhood of the algorithm time-s estimate
of the best-fit vector in the latter stages of the search.
We conducted ten genetic algorithm searches
to identify a best-fit deep parameter vector ∆* T
according to our set of targets defined in Table 1.50
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50 We set the parameters in the genetic algorithm, {population, p
c,p
m,T,b}
as {30, 0.95, 0.11, 1000, 2} based on standards in the evolutionary
programing literature. In our final search, we set T=2500, but we did
not observe a commensurate improvement in performance, and so we
did not pursue higher values of T any further. We set the bounds on
elements δi,i=1,…,9, according to [–0.3, 0.1], [1.1,40], [0.075, 0.33],
[0.25, 0.4], [0.025, 0.075], [0.01, 0.04], [0.01, 0.08], [0.01, 0.4],
[0.01,0.25]. This amounts to a set of constraints on the search to values
that are typically viewed as economically plausible. We initialize the
system by choosing elements in an initial population of vectors ∆





ijs ∆ [] =
= ∑
1
9FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS Bullard and Russell
MAY/JUNE 2004      67
We find that the algorithm time-T population
of parameter vectors ∆* jT provide a close fit on our
target data. The only quantitatively significant dis-
crepancies from targets occur on individual con-
sumption growth and individual time devoted to
market, and then the implied values are typically
only 0.2 to 0.35 of a penalty point from target,
meaning that implied values on these dimensions
lie away from the target only 20 to 35 percent of
the distance between the target and a target bound.
We found little or no variation among individual
parameters within algorithm time s=T populations.
Across searches, we found some variance, almost
all of it in the preference parameters. The estimates
of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, for
instance, ranged from a low of 0.114 to a high of
0.185. Search number 5 provided the best overall
fit, so we use the parameters from this search in
the baseline specification of our model.
Results of Nonlinear Optimization 
Search K/YI /KB /Y hcg alt I
m/YH /YG /YT
K/GF
1 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.24 0.32 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.78
2 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.31 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.69
3 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.57
4 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.29 0.28 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.65 
5  0.01 0.02 0.00 0.25 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 
6  0.02 0.08 0.00 0.31 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.76 
7  0.01 0.01 0.00 0.29 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.61 
8  0.08 0.06 0.00 0.33 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.78 
9  0.04 0.04 0.00 0.33 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.91 
10  0.06 0.02 0.00 0.30 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.62 
NOTE: The fit to the data. The entries are deviations from target, by target and total, in penalty points, for each of the ten searches
we conducted. Columns 2 through 10 are averages across algorithm time s =T populations. Within algorithm time s =T populations,
we found little or no variation across fitness components.
Table A1
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